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This article explores the ethical and legal implications of enrolling 
individuals with disorders of consciousness (DOC) in 
neuroimaging research studies.  Many scientists have strongly 
emphasized the need for additional neuroimaging research into 
DOC, characterizing the conduct of such studies as morally 
imperative.  On the other hand, institutional review boards charged 
with approving research protocols, scientific journals deciding 
whether to publish study results, and federal agencies that disburse 
grant money have limited the conduct, publication, and funding of 
consciousness investigations based on ethical and legal concerns.  
Following a detailed examination of the risks and benefits of 
neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC, the author 
urges IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies to no longer 
stall the conduct, publication, and funding of neuroimaging 
research into DOC if certain criteria designed to protect the health 
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¶ 1 For centuries, disorders of consciousness1 have captured the attention of 
                                                 
1
 The nature of consciousness is widely debated and difficult to define.  See, e.g., TORIN ALTER & SVEN 
WALTER, PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE: NEW ESSAYS ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
PHYSICALISM (2006) (examining the nature of consciousness); Michel Jouvet, Coma and Other Disorders 
of Consciousness, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 116 (P. J. Vinken & G. W. Bruyn eds., 1969) 
(“[C]onsciousness is very difficult to define.”).  In this article, I adopt a clinical neuroscience approach and 
use the word “consciousness” to refer to two elements: an individual’s wakefulness and her awareness of 
self and environment.  See, e.g., Steven Laureys et al., Self-Consciousness in Non-Communicative Patients, 
16 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION (forthcoming) (“For the purposes of clinical neurosciences, 
consciousness consists of two basis elements: arousal (i.e., wakefulness, vigilance or level of 
consciousness) and awareness of environment and of self (i.e., content of consciousness).”); Steven 
Laureys, The Neural Correlate of (Un)awareness: Lessons from the Vegetative State, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCIENCES 556, 556 (2005) (“Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness.”).  I 
use the phrase “disorders of consciousness” to refer to coma, the vegetative state, and the minimally 
conscious state.  THE MOHONK REPORT, A REPORT TO CONGRESS: DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: 
ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND RESEARCH NEEDS 6, available at 
http://www.nbirtt.org/resources/Mohonk_Report_Press_V2.pdf (last visited July 19, 2007) [hereinafter, 
MOHONK REPORT] (defining disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative state, and minimally 
conscious state).  See infra Part I(A) for relevant definitions and diagnostic criteria.   
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physicians, scientists, philosophers, lawyers, and families.2  When an individual partially 
or completely loses consciousness, the answers to questions such as “Can she hear me?” 
“Does he understand me?” “Is she suffering?” and “Will he get better?” can have 
profound clinical, ethical, legal, and social consequences.3  In this article, I explore the 
ethical and legal implications of enrolling individuals with disorders of consciousness in 
neuroimaging research studies. 
¶ 2 Since the middle of the nineteenth century, physicians have used the traditional 
neurological examination to diagnose disorders that we now classify as coma, vegetative 
state, and minimally conscious state.4  Although coma can be diagnosed with relative 
ease, the differential diagnosis of the vegetative and minimally conscious states can be 
challenging.5  In addition, clinicians presently know of no medications or surgical 
interventions that will definitively reduce the length of an individual’s impaired 
consciousness.6 
¶ 3 Over the past decade, however, scientists have used various functional 
neuroimaging technologies to better understand disorders of consciousness, improve 
differential diagnoses, predict short-term improvement, and lay the foundation for future 
studies that may, someday, identify methods of communicating and treating individuals 
with disorders of consciousness.7  During the past four years, scientists have made a 
                                                 
2
 See GERMAN E. BERRIOS, THE HISTORY OF MENTAL SYMPTOMS: DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY SINCE 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1996) (surveying the history of mental disorders, including disorders of 
consciousness, from the nineteenth century to the present). 
3
 See Laureys, Neural Correlate, supra note 1, at 557 (asking, “Do patients in a vegetative state feel or hear 
anything?”); Joy Hirsch et al., fMRI Reveals Intact Cognitive Systems in Two Minimally Conscious 
Patients, SOC’Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE (2001), available at http://fmri.org/pdfs/NS2001.pdf (last visited July 
9, 2007) (asking these questions); Joseph J. Fins, Rethinking Disorders of Consciousness, HASTINGS 
CENTER REPORT, May 31, 2005, at 22-24 (examining how functional neuroimaging study results are used 
to cast doubt on the ethical propriety of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment); MOHONK 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 (“Disorders of consciousness have profound social, ethical, and economic 
consequences.”). 
4
 Very generally, a neurological examination is the clinical assessment of a patient by a physician to 
determine, among other things, the patient’s responsiveness to external stimuli.  See, e.g., Roger A. Barker, 
The Neurological Assessment of Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 15 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REHABILITATION 214, 214 (2005) (describing the neurological assessment of 
patients in the vegetative and minimally conscious states).  The modern neurological examination evolved 
between 1850 and 1914.  B.M. Patten, The History of the Neurological Examination, 1 J. HIST. 
NEUROSCIENCE 3, 3 (1992). 
5
 Lawrence R. Huntoon, The Perilous Vegetative State, 10(2) J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 35, 35 
(2005) (recognizing the difficulty of differentially diagnosing the vegetative and minimally conscious 
states); Roxanne Pickett Hauber, Better Care for Low-Level Brain-Injured Patients and Their Families, J. 
NEUROSCIENCE NURSING, Feb. 1, 2002, (“While the state of coma is relatively easy to diagnose, differential 
diagnosis of other states of reduced consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, 
have proven to be much more difficult.”). 
6
 See, e.g., Steven Laureys et al., How Should Functional Imaging of Patients with Disorders of 
Consciousness Contribute to Their Clinical Rehabilitation Needs?,19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 520, 
520 (2006) (“No treatment has been proven to alter the course of recovery from [vegetative state] or 
[minimally conscious state].”). 
7
 See, e.g., infra notes 8-10.  See generally Joseph T. Giacino et al., Functional Neuroimaging Applications 
for Assessment and Rehabilitation Planning in Patients with Disorders of Consciousness, 87 ARCHIVES 
PHYSICAL MED. REHABILITATION S67, S67 (2006) (reviewing the use of fMRI to “characterize the integrity 
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number of important findings.  In a 2005 study, several American scientists found that 
some individuals in the minimally conscious state may retain widely distributed cortical 
systems that have potential for cognitive and sensory function.8  In a 2006 study, several 
European scientists concluded that functional neuroimaging might be a means by which 
individuals with disorders of consciousness can use their residual cognitive capabilities to 
communicate their thoughts to those around them.9  And, in a 2007 study, scientists from 
China and Belgium suggested that traditional behavioral assessments can miss cerebral 
processing that might herald short-term improvement.10 
¶ 4 In light of these findings, many scientists have strongly emphasized the need for 
additional neuroimaging research into disorders of consciousness,11 characterizing the 
conduct of such studies as morally imperative.12  On the other hand, institutional review 
boards (IRBs) charged with approving research protocols, scientific journals deciding 
whether to publish study results, and federal agencies that disburse grant money have 
limited the conduct, publication, and funding of consciousness investigations based on 
ethical and legal concerns.13  Although several issues have been raised, perhaps the two 
most prominent relate to the relationship between informed consent and neuroimaging 
                                                                                                                                                 
of residual cortical networks and . . . search for neural evidence of cognitive function in patients with 
disorders of consciousness.”). 
8
 Nicholas D. Schiff et al., fMRI Reveals Large Scale Activation in Minimally Conscious Patients, 64 
NEUROLOGY 514, 514 (2005). 
9
 Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006). 
10
 H.B. Di et al., Cerebral Response to Patient’s Own Name in the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious 
States, 68 NEUROLOGY 895, 898 (2007). 
11
 See, e.g., Joy Hirsch, Raising Consciousness, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1102, 1103 (2005) 
(“[A]ccelerated research efforts focused on both investigations of consciousness and disorders of 
consciousness, as well as resolution of the many obstacles to performing the research, could bring about a 
‘quantum leap’ in advantages for informed clinical practice serving severely brain-injured patients.”); 
Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related Disorders, 3 LANCET 
NEUROLOGY 537, 544 (2004) (“Severe brain damage represents an immense social and economic problem 
that warrants further research.  Unconscious, minimally conscious, and locked-in patients deserve special 
procedural protections.  However, it is important to stress that they are also at risk of being denied therapy 
that may be life-saving if clinical research cannot be done on these patient groups.”); see also Steven 
Laureys, Eyes Open, Brain Shut, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 2007, at 32, 37 (“We have learned much 
from new imaging techniques that measure neural activity in brain-damaged patients, but more research is 
needed before scientists can use functional neuroimaging to confirm a diagnosis of the vegetative state and 
to help in the prognosis and treatment of this devastating medical condition.”). 
12
 Douglas Steinberg, Consciousness Is Missing—and So Is Research, 6 EMBO Rep. 1009, 1011 (2005) 
(“Therefore, some observers see a moral imperative, not just an ethical trap, in the study of consciousness 
disorders.”).  See also Benedict Carey, Signs of Awareness Seen in Brain-Injured Patients, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2005 (quoting Columbia neurologist Joy Hirsch’s statement that the failure to conduct additional 
neuroimaging research is “unconscionable”). 
13
 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009 (identifying several legal and ethical concerns); Laureys et al., Brain 
Function, supra note 11, at 544 (“Nonetheless, researchers studying these patients have been refused 
grants, ethics committee approval, and research publication; these decisions tend to be made on the basis 
that studies of patients who cannot provide consent are unethical.”).  See generally Marcia Angell, 
Editorial Responsibility: Protecting Human Rights by Restricting Publication of Unethical Research in 
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 276, 281 
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds. 1992) (discussing the emerging consensus that editors of 
scientific journals should not publish clearly unethical research).  
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risks and benefits.14  Some believe that functional neuroimaging studies do not directly 
benefit individuals with disorders of consciousness, which may cause legal risks-to-
benefits balancing tests15 to balance in favor of no research.16  Others focus on the 
inability of individuals with disorders of consciousness to consent to their own research 
participation, thus implicating ethical and legal principles relating to voluntary and 
informed consent.17 
¶ 5 To further confuse matters, the proper interpretation of relevant ethical and legal 
principles, including the relationship between neuroimaging research risks and benefits 
and surrogate consent to research involving adults, is not clear.  In the United States, 
neither federal nor most state laws provide a nuanced definition of “research benefit.”18  
When we balance research risks and benefits, do we consider only long-term, grand-scale 
therapeutic benefits?  What about short-term clinical improvements, such as a change 
from the vegetative to the minimally conscious state?  What about the benefit of 
diagnostic clarity?  Federal law also does not specifically address the issue of consent to 
research on behalf of adults with disorders of consciousness (or even adults with other 
decisional impairments, including severe psychiatric conditions and developmental 
disabilities),19 and state law in this area varies, if it exists at all.20  The lack of federal 
                                                 
14
 See infra Part I(E) (discussing these concerns in more detail). 
15
 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2007) (requiring the risks of human subjects research to be “reasonable in 
relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may 
reasonably be expected to result.”). 
16
 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1009.  See infra Part I(E), for a brief discussion of the legal and ethical 
concerns frequently raised by institutional review boards, scientific journals, and funding agencies, and 
infra Part III, for an analysis of these issues. 
17
 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) (2007) (requiring scientists conducting human subjects research to seek 
informed consent from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative); id. § 
46.116 (“Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investigator may involve a human being as a 
subject in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed 
consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative.”). 
18
 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2007) (the definition section of the Common Rule, which does not define the 
word benefit); id. § 46.111(a)(2) (stating simply that research risks must be reasonable in relation to 
“anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be 
expected to result.  In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and benefits 
that may result from the research (as distinguished from risks and benefits of therapies subjects would 
receive even if not participating in the research.)”; Nancy M. P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit 
Appropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J. L MED. & ETHICS 332, 332 (2000) (“The Common Rule actually 
doesn’t say much about benefit.”); Jonathan Moreno, Regulation of Research on the Decisionally Impaired: 
History and Gaps in the Current Regulatory System, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (1998) (“The 
[National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research’s] 
recommendations were virtually silent about what constitutes ‘benefit’ to the subject . . . ”). 
19
 A decisional impairment may manifest itself for one or more reasons, including a psychiatric condition, 
developmental disability, dementia, use of drugs and alcohol, and severe illness, just to name a few.  The 
law tends to refer to individuals with decisional impairments as “incompetent” or “incapacitated.”  In this 
Article, I will use the phrase “decisional impairment” as opposed to “incompetence” or “incapacity” 
because decisional impairment is the reason why a particular individual might not be.  See generally infra 
Part II(D) (examining the development of federal law governing human subjects research and explaining its 
failure to address research involving adults with decisional impairments). 
20
 See Moreno, supra note 18, at 14 (“The states are a crazy quilt of regulation in this area, with most 
having no rules that clearly apply to this group while some are quite restrictive.”); infra Part II(E) 
(examining the development of state law governing human subjects research).  
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guidance and the patchwork of state law can make it difficult for American scientists, 
IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies to agree on an applicable regulatory 
framework, especially when the research may be conducted in a laboratory located in one 
city but will draw patients who are residents of neighboring states.21 
¶ 6 The result of this confusion is a chasm, or perhaps a perceived chasm, between 
scientists, who may appear to be overstepping ethical and legal boundaries in their pursuit 
of knowledge and diagnostic clarity even though they have expressly considered the 
ethical and legal implications of their work,22 and ethics committees, scientific journals, 
and funding agencies, which are charged with protecting human subjects and publishing 
and funding only ethical and legal protocols but do not have black-and-white rules to 
guide their efforts.23  This article attempts to bridge this chasm.  Because I think that this 
chasm (real or perceived) lacks balance and subtlety, I attempt to interpret neuroimaging 
research, ethics, and law in the same dimension, rather than assuming that neuroimaging 
research, ethics, and law are necessarily in conflict.24 
¶ 7 In Part I, I will introduce the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging as a 
tool in the investigation of disorders of consciousness and examine three neuroimaging 
research protocols involving individuals in vegetative and minimally conscious states.25  
My aim is to familiarize the reader with the ways in which scientists use functional 
neuroimaging to study disorders of consciousness, the knowledge that is expected to 
result from these studies, the benefits (if any) that may accrue to the research subjects, the 
persons who consent to research participation on behalf of the subjects, the process for 
obtaining consent, and any specific procedures that may have been established to protect 
the subjects’ safety and welfare during their research participation.  As you read Part I, 
think about any tensions, real or perceived, between the scientific goals of pursuing 
knowledge, obtaining diagnostic clarity, and predicting short-term clinical improvement 
and society’s need to protect the health and welfare of human subjects, especially 
subjects who may not be able to protect themselves. 
¶ 8 In Part II, I provide an abbreviated history of human subjects research involving 
individuals with decisional impairments as well as the development of relevant 
American26 ethical and legal human-subjects protections.  These protections emerged 
after it was discovered that scientists recruited individuals with psychiatric disorders and 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1010 (describing an institutional review board’s attempt to stop a 
research protocol involving individuals with disorders of consciousness because the individuals could not 
consent to their own research participation, as well as the scientist’s successful defense, which was that the 
patients resided in states that permit proxy consent). 
22
 See, e.g., Fins, supra note 3, at 23 (“bioethicists need to grapple with the imponderables, both theoretical 
and practical, that attend to disorders of consciousness.”). 
23
 See infra Part II(D) (discussing the lack of federal guidance with respect to research involving adults 
with decisional impairments). 
24
 See Chris Gastmans, Introduction, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH CARE ETHICS 9 (2002) (taking a similar approach to the perceived relationship 
between technology and health care). 
25
 See infra Part I. 
26
 A cross-country comparison of human subjects protections is worthwhile although beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
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developmental disabilities into risky experiments unrelated to their conditions.27  As you 
read Part II, think about whether protections developed as a result of ethically 
questionable studies involving individuals with psychiatric conditions and developmental 
disabilities are, or should be, applicable to studies involving patients in the vegetative and 
minimally conscious states. 
¶ 9 In Part III, I examine whether additional neuroimaging research into disorders of 
consciousness is a moral imperative or an ethical and legal failure.  I analyze in detail the 
relationship between and among the risks of neuroimaging research in a consciously 
disordered population, the reported therapeutic and diagnostic benefits, and the 
knowledge that may be expected to result.  I conclude by calling for a federal regulation 
(or, barring a federal regulation, uniform state laws) that addresses surrogate consent to 
human subjects research involving individuals with decisional impairments. 
¶ 10 A note about my language choices in this article: The use of words and phrases 
in particular orders can reflect negative and disparaging attitudes about individuals with 
physical and mental disabilities.28  For decades, society has referred to individuals with 
disabilities by their disability first and their individuality second.29  One guiding principle 
to maintain the integrity of individuals as whole human beings is to avoid language that 
implies that a person as a whole is disabled by identifying the individual first, then her 
condition.  “An individual with a disability,” “an individual with a disorder of 
consciousness,” or “an individual in the vegetative state” is preferable to “a disabled 
individual,” “a consciously disordered individual,” or “a vegetative individual,” although 
the latter phrases are less bulky.  I have made a concerted effort to adhere to these 
principles, although I do use four acronyms, including disorder of consciousness (DOC), 
locked-in syndrome (LIS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and vegetative state (VS) to 
streamline my sentences.  In addition, it is technically correct to refer to “a patient who 
has a DOC,” “a patient who has LIS,” “a patient who is in the MCS,” and “a patient who 
is in the VS”; however, I will delete the phrases “who has” and “who is in the” and just 
use “a patient with DOC,” “a patient with LIS,” “a patient in MCS,” and “a patient in 
VS” to further streamline my sentences. 
II. NEUROIMAGING RESEARCH INTO DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
A. Functional Neuroimaging and Disorders of Consciousness:  An Overview 
¶ 11 One of the fastest growing scientific fields in terms of the numbers of scientists 
and the knowledge being gained is neuroscience.30  Neuroscience is devoted to the 
scientific study of the nervous system, including its structure, function, development, 
                                                 
27
 See infra Parts II(A)-(C). 
28
 See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Committee on Disability Issues in Psychology, Guidelines 





 JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 3 (2006). 
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genetics, biochemistry, physiology, pharmacology, and pathology.31  “In recent years, 
both the scope of neuroscience and the methodologies employed by neuroscientists have 
broadly expanded, from biochemical and genetic analysis of dynamics of individual 
nerve cells and their molecular constituents to the imaging of both brain structure and 
function.”32  Some believe that the ability of modern neuroimaging techniques to image 
brain structure and function is one of the most significant neuroscientific achievements in 
recent history.33  This article focuses on neuroscientific investigations involving one 
particular type of functional neuroimaging technology—functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI)—to image the brain function of individuals with DOCs. 
¶ 12 Although fMRI is in only its second decade, scientists already have conducted 
tens of thousands of human subjects research studies using the technology, which 
identifies localized changes in blood oxygenation that occur in the brain when an 
individual performs an active or a passive mental task.34  Scientists use fMRI not only to 
map sensory, motor, and cognitive function but also to study the neural correlates of a 
range of physical and mental conditions, behaviors, characteristics, and preferences.35  
Because fMRI is a powerful method of imaging human brain function, especially 
impaired brain function,36 many scientists are interested in imaging the brains of 
individuals with DOCs.37 
¶ 13 In a typical fMRI experiment, scientists assign subjects one or more active or 
passive control and experimental tasks and scan their brains during the performance of 
such tasks.38  fMRI captures in images the different blood-oxygenation-level-dependent 
(BOLD) contrasts that result from the control and experimental tasks.39  By subtracting 
the control images from the experimental images, scientists create “maps” of the brain 
                                                 
31
 See id. at 17. 
32
 Id.  See also Peter Woodruff, Imaging the Brain: Clinical and Research Implications for 
Neuropsychiatry, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH 
CARE ETHICS 145, 147-50 (Chris Gastmans ed., 2002) (providing an overview of structural and functional 
imaging of the brain). 
33
 WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 45 (2007). 
34
 David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC 
RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794-95 (2006); David Dobbs, Hard Science or “Technicolor Phrenology?”: 
The Controversy over fMRI, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, Apr. 2005, available at 
http://daviddobbs.net/page2/page6/page6.html (last visited July 9, 2007).  See generally Stacey A. Tovino, 
Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?  34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 
Parts II and III (2007) (thoroughly reviewing the history of fMRI and its current clinical, research, and 
social applications). 
35.See Tovino, supra note 34, at n.198-226; MORENO, supra note 30, at 98 (“Many . . . projects make use of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), one of the most exciting windows into the black box.”).   
36
 See, e.g., Judy Illes et al., Ethical and Practical Considerations in Managing Incidental Findings in 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 3 BRAIN & COGNITION 358, 358 (2002); Judy Illes, Ethical 
Issues at the Intersection of Imaging and Genomics, Presentation at the Princeton University Symposium: 
Politics of Biomedical Research: Issues, Information and Policy Decision-Making (Mar. 28, 2003). 
37
 Laureys et al., Brain Function, supra note 11, at 537 (noting the frequency with which functional 
neuroimaging is providing new insights into cerebral activity in patients with severe brain damage). 
38. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics, 5 AM. 
J. BIOETHICS 2, 5, 7.  In the case of patients with disorders of consciousness, the tasks assigned are passive 
stimulations.  Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S70. 
39
 See Illes & Racine, supra note 38. 
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showing the areas to which a surplus of oxygenated blood flowed in response to the 
performance of the experimental tasks.40  Scientists then interpret these maps as revealing 
which parts of the brain are implicated by the performance of particular mental tasks or 
the presentation of particular stimuli. 
¶ 14 One area of fMRI research involves the study of DOCs that may follow a stroke, 
head trauma, or other complex injury to the central nervous system.41  The meaning of 
“consciousness” (and, hence, “DOCs”) is widely debated.42  In this article, I adopt a 
clinical neuroscience approach and use the word “consciousness” to refer to an 
individual’s wakefulness and her awareness of self and environment.43  Individuals who 
have disordered consciousness may lack any evidence of consciousness, as in coma, or 
may exhibit limited or inconsistent consciousness, as in the MCS.44  A brief review of 
three disorders of consciousness (coma, VS, and MCS) as well as the LIS is necessary 
before proceeding.45 
¶ 15 A coma is a state of sustained pathologic unconsciousness in which an 
individual’s eyes remain closed and the individual cannot be aroused.46  Individuals in a 
coma display no evidence of awareness of themselves or their environment, no 
purposeful motor activity, no behavioral response to command, and no evidence of 
language comprehension or expression.47  Individuals in a coma usually transition to the 
VS or the MCS within two to four weeks.48 
¶ 16 The VS is a clinical condition of complete unawareness of the self and 
                                                 
40 Id.; Jeffrey R. Binder & Stephen M. Rao, Human Brain Mapping with Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, in LOCALIZATION AND NEUROIMAGING IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 185, 193 (Andrew Kertesz ed., 
1994); Donald Kennedy, Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern Phrenology? AM. 
J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 19. 
41
 Hirsch et al., supra note 3.  See generally Stacey Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the Law 
and Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, Part II (2005) (examining disorders of consciousness that may follow traumatic 
brain injury). 
42
 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
43
 There is no shortage of definitions of the word consciousness in the scientific, philosophical, and law 
literatures.  See, e.g., Laureys et al., Self-Consciousness, supra note 1 at 2 (“There is at present no 
satisfactory, universally accepted definition of human consciousness. . . .   For the purposes of clinical 
neurosciences, consciousness consists of two basis elements: arousal (i.e., wakefulness, vigilance or level 
of consciousness) and awareness of environment and of self (i.e., content of consciousness).”); Laureys, 
Neural Correlate, supra note 1, at 556 (“Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and 
awareness.”).  See generally Alain Morin, Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and 
Integration of Various Views, available at http://www.societyofrobots.com/robottheory/self-
awareness_review.pdf (last visited July 10, 2007) (comparing and integrating a number of views regarding 
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environment accompanied by sleep-wake cycles with either complete or partial 
preservation of hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions.49  Diagnostic criteria 
for VS thus include no evidence of awareness of self or environment; no evidence of 
sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to visual, auditory, 
tactile, or noxious stimuli; and no evidence of language comprehension or expression.50  
Scientists often state that the diagnosis of VS relies on the absence of behaviors that 
typically accompany conscious awareness.51  Individuals in VS do, however, show 
intermittent wakefulness manifested by the presence of sleep-wake cycles,52 sufficiently 
preserved hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions to permit survival with some 
medical and nursing care but usually without mechanical respiration,53 and variably 
preserved cranial nerve (pupillary, oculocephalic, corneal, vestibulo-ocular, gag) and 
spinal reflexes.54 
¶ 17 The MCS is “a condition of severely altered consciousness” in which an 
individual demonstrates “minimal but definite behavioral evidence of self or 
environmental awareness.”55  Diagnostic criteria for MCS thus include the demonstration 
of limited but clearly discernible evidence of self or environmental awareness by one or 
more of the following four behaviors:  (1) following simple commands; (2) gesturing or 
verbally responding “yes” or “no,” regardless of accuracy; (3) intelligible verbalization; 
or (4) purposeful behavior, including movements or behaviors that occur in contingent 
relation to relevant environmental stimuli and are not due to reflexive activity.56  
Examples of qualifying purposeful behavior include appropriate smiling or crying in 
response to linguistic or visual content, eye movement that follows a moving object, and 
reaching for objects.57  These behaviors may occur inconsistently, but they would need to 
be reproducible or sustained long enough to be differentiated from reflexive behavior.58  
Unlike the diagnosis of VS, which is based on the absence of evidence of consciousness, 
the diagnosis of MCS is based on the presence of specific behavioral manifestations of 
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conscious awareness.59  Patients who are in the upper boundary of MCS may say words 
or phrases and gesture and may show evidence of memory, attention, and intention.60  
Only when a patient reliably and consistently communicates, however, will the patient be 
considered to have emerged from MCS to consciousness.61 
¶ 18 Finally, LIS is a condition in which individuals are aware and conscious but 
cannot produce speech, limb, or large-scale facial movements.62  Diagnostic criteria for 
LIS include:  (i) the presence of sustained eye opening; (ii) preserved basic cognitive 
abilities; (iii) aphonia or severe hypophonia; (iv) quadriplegia or quadriparesis; and (v) a 
primary mode of communication that uses vertical or lateral eye movement or blinking of 
the upper eyelid.63  One of the most famous individuals diagnosed with LIS is Jean 
Dominique Bauby, the French editor in chief of Elle magazine who, in 1995, suffered a 
stroke and fell into a coma.64  When Bauby woke up twenty days later, he was mentally 
aware of his surroundings but physically paralyzed except for his ability to move his left 
eyelid.65  Bauby raised his left eyelid to communicate with his family, friends, caregivers, 
and editor through a “blinking code,” which became his sole means of communication.66  
Bauby used this blinking code to dictate his memoir, which was published three days 
prior to his death in 1997.67 
¶ 19 The ability to differentially diagnose VS, MCS, and LIS is important.  The 
diagnosis of LIS is necessary to prevent conscious individuals who are physically 
paralyzed from being treated as though they are unaware of themselves or their 
environment.68  Many scientists believe that differentially diagnosing the VS and the 
MCS is also important because patients in MCS may respond better to therapy and may 
have a better clinical outcome than patients who remain in VS.69  Although physicians 
can diagnose coma with relative ease due to the eyes-shut presentation of the patient,70 
the differential diagnoses of VS, MCS, and LIS have been described as more difficult, 
more subjective, and more dependent on the skill and experience of the examining 
physician, the amount of time the physician spends observing the behavior of the patient, 
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the physical ability of the patient to respond to a particular stimulus, and a number of 
other factors.71  LIS, for example, can be difficult to diagnose because patients may 
emerge to LIS from coma after variable and substantial delays.72  VS and MCS can be 
difficult to distinguish due to the subjectivity traditionally involved in determining 
whether there is some evidence of self- or environmental awareness.73 
¶ 20 Because of these and other challenges, scientists have been studying whether 
fMRI and other functional neuroimaging technologies can provide evidence of cerebral 
networks or an internal form of “awareness” that is not externally observable.74  To 
illustrate these efforts, I review three fMRI studies the results of which have been 
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals during the past four years.  The first study 
involves individuals in MCS, the second study involves individuals in VS, and the third 
study involves individuals in both VS and MCS. 
B. fMRI Study 1:  Large-Scale Network Activation in Patients in MCS 
¶ 21 In one fMRI study published in Neurology in February 2005, scientists at 
Cornell University, Columbia University, Georgetown University Medical Center, and 
the JFK Johnson Rehabilitation Institute hypothesized that patients in MCS may retain 
active cerebral networks that underlie cognitive function (hereinafter, fMRI Study 1).75  
To test their hypothesis, the scientists used fMRI to scan the brains of two adult patients 
who had severe brain injuries that led to MCS and the brains of seven healthy adult 
volunteers.76  The first patient in MCS had experienced a spontaneous bleed in the left 
temporoparietal region of his brain.77  The highest-level behavioral responses that 
physicians observed for this patient included one-step command following, inconsistent 
identification of objects through eye gaze, and intelligible single-word verbalizations.78  
The second patient in MCS had experienced a blunt trauma to the right frontal region of 
his brain.79  The highest-level behavioral responses that physicians observed for the 
second patient included occasional verbalization and an inconsistent ability to follow 
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complex commands.80 
¶ 22 By definition, the two patients in MCS were unable to consent to their own 
research participation.81  The scientists obtained informed consent to the patients’ 
research participation from surrogates:  “Legally authorized surrogates for both patients 
were contacted by medical personnel not directly involved in the current studies.  
Informed consent was obtained according to institutional guidelines on two occasions, 
allowing for a period of evaluation and opportunity for additional information.”82 
¶ 23 During the study, the scientists used fMRI to scan the patients’ brains while 
conducting three different passive stimulation activities.  First, the scientists gently 
rubbed the patients’ palms and fingers with a coarse-textured plastic surface, an activity 
selected because of the patients’ inflexible hand positions.83  Second, the scientists placed 
headphones on the patients and played an audio narrative of familiar events spoken by 
persons familiar to the patients.84  Third, the scientists played through the same 
headphones the same audio narrative, but this time in reverse.  Here, it was assumed that 
the backwards statements would be recognizable as speech but that the linguistic content 
of the speech would not be recognizable.85  The scientists performed each activity twice 
for a total of six passive stimulations per patient in MCS.86 
¶ 24 The scientists found that the forward playing of the audio narratives elicited 
activity in regions of the brains (the superior and middle temporal gyrus) of the two 
patients in MCS and that the seven healthy volunteers demonstrated similar activations 
when comparably stimulated.87  When the scientists played the audio narratives in 
reverse, however, they found “markedly reduced” responses in the brains of the two 
patients in MCS as compared with the brains of the seven healthy volunteers.88  The 
scientists suggested, therefore, that the two patients in MCS had “reduced engagement for 
linguistically meaningless stimuli.”89  After stating that they had presented the first fMRI 
maps of neural responses to tactile stimulation and language processing of individuals in 
MCS,90 the scientists further suggested that individuals in MCS may retain widely 
distributed cortical systems with potential for cognitive and sensory function despite the 
individuals’ inability to follow simple instructions or communicate reliably.91 
¶ 25 The same day the study was published in Neurology, New York Times reporter 
Benedict Carey suggested to millions of readers that patients in MCS may be, literally 
and in the lay sense of the word, “aware” of what goes on around them:  “Thousands of 
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brain-damaged people who are treated as if they are almost completely unaware may in 
fact hear and register what is going on around them but be unable to respond, a new 
brain-imaging study suggests.”92  Carey also quoted the opinion of one of the study 
authors that it was “morally imperative” to pursue fMRI research involving individuals in 
MCS: 
The most consequential thing about this is that we have opened a door, we 
have found an objective voice for these patients, which tells us they have 
some cognitive ability in a way they cannot tell us themselves. . . .  [The 
patients are] more human than we imagined in the past, and it is 
unconscionable not to aggressively pursue research efforts to evaluate 
them and develop therapeutic techniques.93 
Following the publication of the study, many other scientists agreed that the study 
findings warranted further research in this area.94  Others, however, found the study to be 
more suggestive than conclusive and clarified that the results did not mean that patients in 
MCS were likely to recover or that treatment was possible.95 
C. fMRI Study 2:  Detecting Awareness in the VS 
¶ 26 In a second fMRI study published in Science in September 2006, scientists at the 
University of Cambridge and University of Liège went one step further by hypothesizing 
that fMRI might provide a means for detecting not only preserved brain function but also 
conscious awareness in individuals diagnosed as vegetative using standard clinical testing 
(hereinafter, fMRI Study 2).96  To test their hypothesis, the scientists proposed to use 
fMRI to scan the brain of a twenty-three-year-old woman who had suffered a severe 
traumatic brain injury and whom a multidisciplinary clinical team had subsequently 
diagnosed as vegetative.97  Because the woman could not consent to her own research 
participation, the scientists obtained consent to the woman’s research participation from 
her next of kin.98 
¶ 27 During the study, the scientists gave the woman spoken instructions to perform 
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two mental imagery tasks.99  The first instruction was to imagine playing a game of 
tennis.100  The second instruction was to imagine visiting all of the rooms of her house, 
starting from the front door.101  During the periods when the scientists asked the woman 
to imagine playing tennis, they observed significant activity in an area of her brain known 
as the supplemental motor area.102  During the periods when the scientists asked the 
woman to imagine herself walking through her home, they observed significant activity 
in different regions of the brain, including the parahippocampal gyrus, the posterior 
parietal cortex, and the lateral premotor cortex.103  When the scientists compared the 
woman’s neural responses with the responses of healthy volunteers who performed the 
same imagery tasks, the responses were indistinguishable.104  The scientists concluded 
that although the woman fulfilled the traditional clinical criteria for VS, she was, in 
scientific terms, consciously aware of herself and her surroundings: 
[T]his patient retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to 
respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or 
movement.  Moreover, her decision to cooperate with the authors by 
imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represents a clear act of 
intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously 
aware of herself and her surroundings.105 
The scientists also stated that fMRI might be a method by which other patients in VS and 
MCS could “use their residual cognitive capabilities to communicate their thoughts to 
those around them by modulating their own neural activity.”106 
¶ 28 Again writing for the New York Times, although this time on page A1, Benedict 
Carey reported, “A severely brain-damaged woman in an unresponsive, vegetative state 
showed clear signs of conscious awareness on brain imaging tests.”107  Carey quoted a 
Cornell scientist, who was not involved in the study, as stating that the study provided 
“‘knock-down, drag-out’ evidence for conscious activity, but that it was not clear 
‘whether we’ll see this in one out of 100 vegetative patients, or one out of 1,000, or ever 
again.’”108  The Times write-up included other, more cautious quotations:   
The imaging techniques used in the new study could help identify which 
patients are most likely to emerge—once the tests are studied in larger 
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numbers of unconscious people. . . .  “For now I think what this study does 
is to create another shade of gray in the understanding of gray matter.”109 
Other scientists were less impressed with the study authors’ conclusions, calling them far 
fetched110 and warning of their ethical, social, and other implications:  “The question of 
conscious awareness in the vegetative state has relevance far beyond the limits of the 
neuroscience community, with an impact on individual lives that is hard to calculate. . . . 
[I]t is imperative that alternative data interpretations be carefully considered before 
making radical inferences.”111 
D. fMRI Study 3:  Cerebral Responses to Patient’s Own Name 
¶ 29 Scientists continue to use fMRI to study disorders of consciousness.  In a third 
fMRI study published in Neurology in March 2007, scientists from China and Belgium 
hypothesized that fMRI might be useful to preclinically distinguish VS and MCS 
(hereinafter, fMRI Study 3).112  (Remember, some scientists believe that patients in MCS 
may respond better to therapy and ultimately may have a better clinical outcome than 
patients who remain in VS.113  Reports of patients in MCS but misdiagnosed as VS for 
almost twenty years add fuel to the desire for more accurate diagnoses.114)  To test their 
hypothesis, the scientists used fMRI to scan and compare the brain activations of seven 
patients in VS and four patients in MCS, all but two of whom had experienced traumatic 
brain injury.115  Due to the importance of their initial diagnoses, the scientists used 
extensive and repeated clinical testing, including five different validated behavioral 
scales, to arrive at an initial diagnosis of VS or MCS for each patient.116  Because the 
patients were unable to consent to their own research participation, “[i]nformed written 
consent was obtained from the families of all patients, and the study was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of Zhejiang University School of Medicine.”117 
¶ 30 After obtaining family consent, the scientists used headphones to deliver to each 
patient a digital recording of the patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice (SON-
FV), which in this case happened to be a voice of a first-degree family member.118  The 
scientists chose SON-FV, a powerful “emotionally laden auditory stimuli,” with the hope 
of maximizing their chances of detecting residual brain function.119  During the study, the 
scientists scanned the patients’ brains using a block design that incorporated six active 
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blocks (during each of which seven SON-FVs were presented) and seven baseline blocks 
(during which only the noise of the MRI machine was available).120  Because accurate 
MRI scanning requires the patient to lie still, and because patients in VS and MCS have 
reflexive and uncontrolled body movements that tend to increase with the noise of the 
magnet in the MRI machine, the scientists used special headphones and placed 
homemade head-fixation devices on each patient.121 
¶ 31 The scientists found that two of the patients in VS failed to show any significant 
cerebral activation, three of the patients in VS showed SON-FV-induced activation 
within the primary auditory cortex, and two of the patients in VS and all four of the 
patients in MCS showed activation not only in the primary auditory cortex but also in 
hierarchically higher-order associative temporal areas.122  The scientists conducted 
additional behavioral testing at one, two, and three months post-study to examine the 
prognostic value of the study123 and found that the two patients in VS who showed the 
most widespread activation actually had improved to MCS.124  The scientists opined that 
traditional behavioral assessments (assessments without scanning) can miss cerebral 
processing that might herald short-term improvement: 
In our opinion, these two patients were already with MCS during fMRI 
scanning but behavioral signs of consciousness could (even using the best 
clinical assessments available) only be shown 3 months later.  This 
interpretation is in line with previous reports showing unusual activation 
of higher order areas (using respectively presentation of familiar faces and 
verbal stimuli) followed by clinical recovery some months later.  Hence, 
fMRI seems to offer a higher sensitivity to identify cognitive processing in 
patients emerging from a VS compared to bedside clinical tools.125   
¶ 32 The scientists concluded that using fMRI to measure cerebral responses to a 
patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice might be a useful method of preclinically 
identifying some patients with “minimally conscious state–like cognitive processing.”126 
¶ 33 Several scientists who commented on the published study agreed that it added to 
the evidence that the brains of some individuals in VS support more cerebral processing 
of external stimuli than their behavioral state suggests and that such processing portends 
better short-term prognosis.127  They also emphasized, however, that patients with 
“minimally conscious–like processing” were still “cognitively devastated” and that end-
of-life decision making, including decisions to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment, should not be altered.128  One commentator stated more directly:  “None of this 
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changes the fact however that most people wouldn’t want to be kept alive artificially in a 
MCS either and going from a [persistent] VS to an MCS is no real improvement in the 
big scheme of things.”129 
E. Practical, Legal, and Ethical Limitations 
¶ 34 Throughout this part, I have briefly introduced a few hurdles posed by fMRI 
research involving individuals with DOC, including their inability to consent to their own 
research participation and their inability to follow instructions to hold still in an MRI 
scanner.  I would like to expand on these hurdles and introduce a few additional practical, 
ethical, legal, and social obstacles to neuroimaging research involving individuals with 
DOC.  These obstacles include, but certainly are not limited to, the cost of and lack of 
funding for neuroimaging studies, the absence of a federal law and a patchwork of state 
laws governing surrogate consent for individuals with DOC, and the communication 
barriers between and among scientists, reporters, lawyers, ethicists, and other 
stakeholders. 
¶ 35 Neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC is costly.  Imagine a 
research project that involves only healthy volunteers who transport themselves to a 
research laboratory or other test site, unaccompanied by healthcare personnel, to take a 
written psychological test.  The healthy volunteers walk, drive, or use public 
transportation to transport themselves to the test site; read and complete the written test 
under the supervision of the scientists, their study coordinators, graduate students, or 
other test proctors; and then transport themselves home.  Not all, but certainly some, 
research protocols are this easy to coordinate and are relatively inexpensive.  But when a 
research project involves a patient with DOC, some of whom may be residents of 
rehabilitation hospitals or other long-term care facilities, the scientists must arrange and 
pay for the safe transport of the patient from the facility to the laboratory, which may 
include an ambulance, and must provide any medical support needed by the patient, 
which may include monitoring by an intensive care physician during the study.130 
¶ 36 Neuroimaging research involving patients with DOC also can be time 
consuming and generate a fair amount of unusable data.  As mentioned in fMRI Study 3, 
many patients in VS and MCS have reflexive and uncontrolled body movements that 
increase with the noise of the magnet that lies within the MRI machine.131  Because 
accurate MRI results require patients to lie still during the scanning procedure, scientists 
may place special noise-reduction headphones and head-fixation devices on their 
subjects.132  Even with these devices, some subjects still move their heads too much.  In 
fMRI Study 3, for example, the scientists initially enrolled seven patients in VS and five 
patients in MCS, although they were subsequently forced to exclude data relating to one 
patient in MCS who moved her head too much in synchronization with the auditory 
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stimuli while she was in the scanner.133  The data had to be thrown away because it was 
impossible for the scientists to separate the neural responses that were due to the stimuli 
(the audio recording of the patient’s own name spoken by a familial voice) versus the 
movement of the patient’s head.134  Other scientists conducting neuroimaging studies 
have experienced a failure rate of up to two out of every three patients in MCS who are 
scanned.135 
¶ 37 Traditional government funding usually does not cover all or even some of these 
costs of neuroimaging research in consciously disordered populations.  In the United 
States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
and other federal agencies do not grant significant funds for the study of DOC.136  
Knowing this, some American scientists request funds not from the NIH or NSF but from 
disability-based agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Education’s National Institute 
on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, which has separate funding for traumatic-
brain-injury research.137  European scientists also report difficulty obtaining funding for 
their consciousness studies, especially in comparison to their investigations of 
Parkinson’s disease and other, more traditional, degenerative neurological conditions.138 
¶ 38 Legal and ethical concerns, typically raised by IRBs charged with approving 
research protocols, scientific journals deciding whether to publish study results, and 
government funding agencies, further limit the conduct and publication of consciousness 
investigations.139  In particular, IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies are 
concerned (1) that neuroimaging studies do not directly benefit research subjects, which 
may cause the risk-to-benefits balancing test140 to balance in favor of no research; (2) that 
some functional neuroimaging studies pose more than a minimal risk of injury to 
subjects;141 and (3) about the inability of patients with DOC to consent to their own 
research participation, which implicates ethical and legal principles relating to voluntary 
and informed consent.142  Although fMRI generally is considered minimal risk, other 
functional neuroimaging technologies, including positron emission tomography (PET), 
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do require the injection of radioactive tracers that are considered riskier.143 
¶ 39 “Whether or not these arguments are raised depends on the institution, locality 
and country in which a particular study is being evaluated.”144  Some scientists 
experience few ethical and legal obstacles in the conduct of their research, while other 
scientists encounter them frequently.  An IRB reportedly tried to stop the research of 
Columbia neurologist Joy Hirsch, one of the authors of fMRI Study 1, two different 
times.145  In one of these cases, the IRB reportedly told her that she could not obtain 
surrogate (or proxy) consent to the research participation of an individual in VS or 
MCS.146  Dr. Hirsch was able to continue her research by proving that her subjects were 
residents of states that permit proxy consent.147  But her defense highlights a related 
issue, which is that federal law does not specifically address consent to research on behalf 
of adults with decisional impairments,148 and state law in this area varies, if it exists at 
all.149  The lack of federal guidance and the patchwork of state law can make it difficult 
for scientists and their IRBs to agree on an applicable regulatory framework, especially 
when the research may be conducted in a laboratory located in one state (e.g., New York) 
but will draw patients who are residents of neighboring states (e.g., the Tri-State Area) 
and beyond. 
¶ 40 Although IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies may attempt to limit 
the conduct, publication, and funding of neuroimaging studies involving patients with 
DOC, other religious and political organizations, including organizations that oppose 
abortion and stem-cell research, support research into DOC.150  The Vatican reportedly 
extended an invitation to Belgian neurologist Steven Laureys, one of the authors of fMRI 
Studies 2 and 3, because the Vatican liked his PET research findings showing brain 
activations in patients in VS who received electric shocks.151  Not Dead Yet, a disability 
advocacy group that opposes the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
from patients in VS and MCS, also supports research into DOC, especially when the 
study results show more clearly that these patients are not dead yet.152  Indeed, a research 
analyst at Not Dead Yet hopes that continued consciousness research will show that 
patients in VS and MCS “clearly have significant cognitive activity going on” even 
though society may be “writ[ing] them off.” 
¶ 41 To further confuse matters, scientists have spoken publicly about their research 
findings and their desire to conduct additional research, and these statements have led to 
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misunderstandings by some of the nonscientists who read and hear the statements.153  The 
scientists’ statements to the media are excited and hopeful and, well, scientific.154  After 
all, these individuals spend their lives studying and testing questions at the cutting edges 
of their fields.  But someone must translate the scientists’ complex research findings into 
copy that will be read by the general public.155  Some journalists do not have clinical or 
scientific backgrounds and are not necessarily equipped to summarize complex research 
studies for laypersons.156  Journalism, which is designed to sell, and the reporting of 
scientific findings in peer-reviewed journals, which is supposed to be objective and 
dispassionate, also may not be the best of partners.  This problem, sometimes called the 
problem of “science in public,” can result in journalistic distortion.157  The problem 
becomes confounded when lawyers and ethicists, who may become aware of scientific 
developments first through the media, make relatively conservative legal and ethical 
pronouncements based on statements made in media reports or questions posed by 
reporters.  In response, scientists attempt to re-explain their research findings back to the 
lawyers, ethicists, and media, all the while trying not to engage in therapeutic nihilism,158 
on one hand, or “engender[] expectations for the permanently unconscious,” on the 
other.159 
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¶ 42 To begin to evaluate the seemingly opposing viewpoints of the scientists who 
conduct neuroimaging research and the lawyers, ethicists, and others who may be critical 
of the research, I provide in Part II an abbreviated history of research involving 
individuals with decisional impairments.  Part II lays the foundation for Part III, in which 
I examine the ethical and legal appropriateness of additional neuroimaging research into 
disorders of consciousness. 
III. AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF RESEARCH INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DECISIONAL IMPAIRMENTS 
¶ 43 The ancient and modern history of human subjects research, its ethical 
implications, and its regulation in the United States and abroad have been thoroughly 
researched and documented elsewhere.160  In this part, I provide an abbreviated history of 
medical experimentation involving individuals with psychiatric conditions and 
developmental disabilities as well as the development of relevant American161 legal and 
ethical human-subjects protections.  I review research studies involving individuals with 
psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities for three interrelated reasons.  First, 
a long and well-documented history of experimentation involving individuals with DOC 
does not exist.  Second, analogies among the three populations (individuals with 
psychiatric conditions, developmental disabilities, and DOC) have, although not without 
controversy, been made because individuals in all three groups may have reduced, 
limited, or no capacity to make decisions to participate in research.162  Third, the 
development of ethical and legal principles governing research participation by 
individuals with decisional impairments was attempted after it was discovered that 
scientists recruited individuals with psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities 
into risky experiments, many of which were unrelated to their conditions. 
A. Ancient and Modern Research Trends 
¶ 44 If “experimentation in man for scientific purposes is as old as recorded 
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history,”163 then experimentation in captive and vulnerable men, including criminals and 
individuals with mental disorders, is almost as old.  Criminals were considered fair game 
for medical experiments by ancient Persian Kings, the Ptolemies in Egypt, and Fallopius 
in Pisa during the Renaissance, in part because of their captivity, which eased the 
administrative burden associated with their recruitment.164  Individuals with mental 
disorders also were used in ancient experiments, perhaps because they were considered 
expendable.  A Persian prince at the time of Avicenna told new physicians, “[I]f you wish 
to gain experience and a reputation you must experiment freely, but you had better not 
choose people of high rank or political importance for your subjects.”165  Perhaps this 
philosophy opened the door for twentieth-century scientists to enroll individuals with 
psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities in medical experiments.166 
¶ 45 An early twentieth-century example is British researcher William Fletcher’s 
beriberi experiment.  In the early 1900s, beriberi (a nervous disorder caused by thiamine 
deficiency) was particularly problematic, and scientists were actively studying methods 
of prevention.167  To that end, in 1905, Fletcher identified a captive population of 
research subjects among the patients of a lunatic asylum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and 
assigned each patient a number.168  The odd-numbered patients were given the regular 
hospital diet.169  The even-numbered patients were given rice cured with Vitamin B.170  
Forty-three of the 120 patients assigned to the regular hospital diet developed beriberi, 
eighteen of whom later died.171  Only two of the patients assigned to the cured rice 
developed beriberi, neither of whom died.172  Little attention was given to Fletcher’s 
decision to use a confined population of individuals with psychiatric conditions to 
conduct his experiment. 
¶ 46 The practice of enrolling vulnerable individuals in medical experiments 
continued throughout the early twentieth century.  In about 1915, Austrian researchers 
injected tuberculosis bacilli and alcohol into individuals with mental disorders.173  In 
1917, Austrian physician Julius Wagner-Jauregg inoculated patients, diagnosed as insane 
by virtue of neurosyphilis, with malaria parasites—an experiment that proved successful 
and earned him the Nobel Prize in Medicine or Physiology in 1927.174  The use of 
patients with mental disorders as research subjects apparently was not uncommon in the 
early 1900s.175 
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¶ 47 Experimentation involving patients with mental disorders continued throughout 
the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.  During the Second World War, the federal 
Committee on Medical Research of the White House’s Office of Scientific Research and 
Development approved the use of Mississippi insane-asylum patients in research 
protocols designed to investigate influenza.176  In 1949, Portuguese psychiatrist and 
neurosurgeon Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize for his leucotomy experiments, during 
which he removed the frontal lobe of very anxious and aggressive patients with mental 
disorders to test whether surgery would lessen their anxiety and frustration.177  Although 
Moniz used vulnerable research subjects in his experiments, his aim was to ease the 
symptoms that made them vulnerable in the first place. 178  In some cases, he 
succeeded.179 
¶ 48 Not all twentieth-century research projects involving vulnerable populations 
were designed to improve the subjects’ psychiatric or developmental conditions.  
Although the modern history of human subjects research contains dozens of examples of 
medical experiments that harmed vulnerable patients, I will review two particular 
experiments that I believe illustrate, to varying extents, some of the concerns raised by 
IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies with respect to neuroimaging research of 
DOC.  These experiments include the U.S. Army’s chemical warfare research, conducted 
in the early 1950s180 and the hepatitis experiments conducted at Willowbrook Hospital 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.181  The relevant legal and ethical concerns include, 
but certainly are not limited to, the (un)reasonableness of the research risks in relation to 
the expected benefits, scientists’ use of captive, vulnerable populations for medical 
experimentation, and the lack of first-person informed consent (or continued consent) to 
research participation. 
B. Harold Blauer and the Army’s Chemical Warfare Research 
¶ 49 In the mid-1900s, the U.S. Army became interested in the use of hallucinogenic 
compounds as potential chemical warfare agents, and in 1951, the Army Chemical Center 
proposed to study the effect of psychochemical agents on various confined populations, 
including patients at the New York State Psychiatric Institute (“Psychiatric Institute”).182  
According to the Army Chemical Center’s research proposal, “new technical data will be 
derived . . . which will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents 
both for offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection against them.”183  That 
same year, the Army Chemical Corps (“Army”) and the Psychiatric Institute entered into 
two contracts for the psychological and psychiatric investigation of potential chemical 
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warfare agents.184  Pursuant to the contracts, the Army would give chemical derivates of 
mescaline, a hallucinogenic alkaloid of the phenethylamine class, to the Psychiatric 
Institute.  The Psychiatric Institute would, in turn, inject the derivatives into a group of 
patients and report the findings back to the Army every three months.185 
¶ 50 Around the same time, forty-two-year-old Harold Blauer, a tennis professional 
and former ranked tennis player,186 voluntarily admitted himself to the Psychiatric 
Institute for treatment for his severe depression, which was later diagnosed as pseudo-
neurotic schizophrenia.187  Under the care of Dr. George Schnack, one of the therapists at 
the Psychiatric Institute, Blauer’s condition steadily improved.188  A few weeks before 
Blauer was set to be released, the Psychiatric Institute scheduled him to receive a series 
of mescaline injections pursuant to its research contract with the Army.189  The mescaline 
injections for which Blauer was scheduled were completely unrelated to his psychiatric 
condition.190  The injections were not intended to serve a diagnostic or therapeutic 
purpose; instead, their sole purpose was to help the Army gather data about the use of 
mescaline derivatives as potential chemical warfare agents.191  According to a judicial 
opinion published almost thirty-five years following the experiment, Blauer reportedly 
was aware that the drugs he would be given were experimental in the sense that they did 
not come from a pharmacy; however, he was unaware that their purpose was not to help 
him but, instead, to help develop chemical warfare agents.192  Blauer reportedly was not 
asked to give written informed consent to his own research participation, although he 
gave oral consent, at least initially.193 
¶ 51 Blauer received one injection per week for five weeks in December 1952 and 
January 1953.194  According to study records made immediately prior to his first 
injection, Blauer was “very apprehensive” about taking part in the study, and 
“considerable persuasion [was] required” to make him accept the first injection.195  The 
chemical reportedly caused a feeling of pressure in Blauer’s head and a slight tremor in 
his right leg.196  The study records made prior to the second injection indicate that Blauer 
again was “apprehensive,” although this time there was little or no physical reaction to 
the chemical.197  Prior to his third injection, the nurses observed that Blauer was more 
disturbed about his continued participation in the research.198  Blauer reportedly asked 
one of the nurses if she would call the physicians in charge of the study and tell them that 
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he had a cold, because the doctors would not believe Blauer if he told them.199  
Notwithstanding this request, Blauer received his third injection, which caused him to 
shake all over.200  Prior to his fourth injection, Blauer stated that he did not want to 
receive any more injections.201  In response, Blauer was told that if he did not continue 
his research participation, he would have to leave the Psychiatric Institute and return to 
Bellevue or Roosevelt Hospital, where he had been admitted and unhappy prior to his 
admission to the Psychiatric Institute.202  Blauer reportedly did not pursue his complaints 
any further. 203  The fourth injection caused Blauer to suffer a violent reaction, including 
body tremors and repeated sitting up and flopping back down.204 
¶ 52 For his fifth injection, Blauer was to receive 450 milligrams, or sixteen times the 
amount, of the derivative he had received in his first injection.205  Before this injection, 
Blauer again complained to his therapist and the nurses about the injections.206  
Notwithstanding, Blauer received the injection sometime between 9:53 and 9:57 a.m. on 
January 8, 1953, after which he became restless and started sweating profusely and 
flailing his arms.207  Then, his body stiffened, his teeth clenched, and he began frothing at 
the mouth.208  Finally, he fell into a deep coma.209  Harold Blauer was pronounced dead 
at 12:15 p.m.210  Shortly thereafter, the Psychiatric Institute informed the New York City 
Medical Examiner of Blauer’s death, stating in its written report that Blauer’s injections 
were for diagnostic purposes, not research: 
The patient received an intravenous injection of a mescaline derivative at 
9:53 a.m. on January 8, 1953 for diagnostic purposes.  He had received 
this drug previously with no untoward reaction.  A few minutes after the 
injection the patient became unconscious, showed a tonic rigidity of neck 
and arms and legs, became cyanotic, pulse became thready and blood 
pressure dropped to 110/40.  He was given intravenous glucose and 
coramine and nasal oxygen and he showed a marked improvement.  He 
started to speak and appeared to be on the way to recovery.  Then he 
suddenly became pulseless, blood pressure dropped, respiration ceased 
and he expired.  He was pronounced dead at 12:15 p.m.211 
¶ 53 Although the experiment was conducted in late 1952 and early 1953, it was not 
until 1975 that it was publicly disclosed that the Army had supplied the chemicals Blauer 
received and that the injections were part of an experiment to develop chemical warfare 
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agents.212  In the meantime, Blauer’s survivors, on behalf of his estate, brought several 
actions against the State of New York and the Psychiatric Institute, resulting in several 
judicial opinions that contain significant detail about the experiment, including copies of 
study records documenting Blauer’s reactions to all five injections.213  As explained by 
federal District Court Judge Constance Baker Motley in a judicial opinion authored in 
1987, the Army and the Psychiatric Institute treated Blauer like a guinea pig: 
The case arises from the death of Harold Blauer, a mental patient who died 
in 1953 as a guinea pig in an experiment to test potential chemical warfare 
agents for the United States Army.  Rather than admit its role in Blauer's 
death, the Government covered up its involvement in the affair, thus this 
opinion is issued today rather than in the early 1950’s when the death 
occurred.214 
The judge’s reference to guinea pigs was, perhaps, an allusion to Englishman M. H. 
Pappworth’s book Human Guinea Pigs, which exposed numerous experiments in which 
vulnerable human subjects, including individuals with mental disabilities who could not 
consent to their own research participation, were enrolled in nontherapeutic research.215 
¶ 54 I selected the Blauer case for review because it illustrates several legal and 
ethical concerns relating to the reasonableness of research risks in relation to expected 
benefits, the use of captive, vulnerable populations for medical experimentation, and the 
lack of informed consent (or continued consent) to research participation.  First, the 
Blauer case contains obvious issues relating to the reasonableness of the risks posed to 
Blauer and the other subjects by the mescaline injections in relationship to the anticipated 
benefits.  According to the Army’s own research proposal, the anticipated benefits 
included “new technical data . . . [that] will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of 
psychochemical agents both for offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection 
against them.”216  The anticipated benefits did not include therapeutic benefits to Blauer 
or to the other research subjects.217  The question thus becomes whether the risks posed 
by the chemicals were reasonable in relationship to the importance of the expected 
chemical warfare data.  In hindsight, the question certainly would be answered in the 
negative.  The death of a subject certainly outweighs any potential benefit to be derived 
from new chemical warfare knowledge.  The question is supposed to be answered 
prospectively, however.  Although the scientists probably did not know, at least 
definitely, that Blauer or another subject would die, they were aware, as a result of prior 
toxicity testing involving mice, that death (at least to mice) was a possibility.218  They 
also knew (or at least one court found that they knew) that the scientists had not yet 
conducted additional toxicity testing sufficient to determine the chemical’s safety in 
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humans.219  Many believe that the risks posed to Blauer and to the other research 
subjects, even viewed prospectively, were not reasonable in relationship to the 
knowledge that was expected to result. 
¶ 55 With respect to concerns relating to captivity and vulnerability, it is important to 
note that Blauer was an inpatient at a psychiatric hospital.  Although he was a voluntary 
patient, which means he technically could have left the Psychiatric Institute against 
medical advice at any time, he appears to have wanted to stay and receive treatment until 
his condition resolved to the point where he could resume normal daily activities at work 
and home.  This is supported by evidence that Blauer was unhappy and had left two 
previous psychiatric facilities, Bellevue and Roosevelt Hospital, and that Blauer was 
staying and making substantial progress at the Psychiatric Institute and had agreed, 
together with his therapist, to a release date a few weeks later, in early 1953.220 
¶ 56 Note, however, that when Blauer stated prior to his fourth injection that he no 
longer wanted to receive the injections, he was told that if he did not continue the 
injections, he would be forced to leave the Psychiatric Institute and return to Bellevue or 
Roosevelt Hospital.221  This statement supports Blauer’s constructive captivity.  Stated 
another way, although Blauer technically could have left the Psychiatric Institute at any 
time, it used Blauer’s desire to receive further treatment to coerce him into participating 
in its research project.  We also might say that Blauer’s attempt to withdraw from 
research participation involved a penalty, which would be the loss of access to continued 
treatment at the Psychiatric Institute.  As will be reviewed in Part II(D), federal law now 
requires scientists to allow research subjects to withdraw their research participation at 
any time without any penalties or the loss of any benefits to which they may be otherwise 
entitled.222 
¶ 57 In addition to concerns relating to captive, vulnerable populations, the Blauer 
case raises potential competency issues and serious informed consent issues.  Some 
patients with severe mental illness, such as untreated schizophrenia, may not be 
competent to consent to their own research participation because they may not be able to 
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to participate in 
research.223  Clinicians must make an individualized determination regarding whether a 
particular patient does or does not have decision-making capacity.224  In Blauer’s case, he 
did have an initial diagnosis of severe depression and/or pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia; 
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however, he was scheduled to be released within a few weeks “without any disability,” 
and it was expected that he would return to teaching tennis and parenting his children.225 
Even by today’s standards, Blauer probably would be considered competent to give 
consent to his own research participation because he had the ability to understand and 
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own research participation and to reach an 
informed decision regarding the matter.226  Blauer was not, however, informed of the true 
nature of the experiment to which he was asked to consent.227  Remember, Blauer was 
unaware that his injections were being administered to help the Army’s chemical warfare 
efforts and that the injections were not for his own benefit.228  Blauer thus was competent 
to give his consent, but any consent that he did give was not informed and would not be 
considered valid by today’s standards.229 
C. Hepatitis Experimentation at Willowbrook Hospital 
¶ 58 The Army’s chemical warfare research project certainly was not the last 
experiment that involved patients with mental disorders.  In 1967, British physician H. 
M. Pappworth wrote about a number of questionable research studies, including one 
experiment that investigated blood flow in the brains of over one hundred elderly patients 
with dementia.230  During this experiment, scientists inserted long needles into each 
patient’s jugular veins and femoral artery while the patient inhaled radioactive gas. 231  
The publication of these and other study results in prestigious science journals such as 
British Medical Journal and Journal of Clinical Investigation suggests both the 
commonality and the acceptance of experiments involving patients with mental disorders 
in the mid-1900s.232 
¶ 59 Even these experiments, however, are said to pale in comparison with the 
questionable research activities that occurred at the Willowbrook State School 
(Willowbrook) on Staten Island in New York in the mid-1960s.233  During this study, Dr. 
Saul Krugman and a group of infectious-disease physicians from New York University 
decided to use students at Willowbrook to study the natural history of hepatitis and 
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develop possible treatments.234  The students at Willowbrook had severe mental 
retardation,235 a condition we would now call severe intellectual or developmental 
disability,236 and reportedly, many of the students acquired hepatitis following admission 
due to repeated exposure to each others’ body fluids. 237 
¶ 60 During his study, Krugman intentionally infected Willowbrook students with the 
live hepatitis B virus.238  Krugman justified his experiment by what he referred to as the 
inevitableness of hepatitis in the student body (according to Krugman, most of the 
Willowbrook students acquired hepatitis within the first six to twelve months of their 
admission239), the reported mildness of the disease symptoms in this particular school-
aged population, and his belief that the students’ research participation actually benefited 
them because mild hepatitis infection provides protection against future, and more severe, 
hepatitis infections.240  Krugman reportedly obtained approval to proceed with his study 
from two New York State agencies: the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board and the 
human-experimentation committees of the New York University School of Medicine and 
the Willowbrook School.241 
¶ 61 The Willowbrook students were incompetent to consent to their own research 
participation because many were less than eighteen years old and had severe intellectual 
and developmental disabilities, the latter of which made it impossible for even the older 
students to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to 
participate in research.242  Krugman thus obtained consent to the students’ research 
participation from their parents.243  In many cases, the consent was coerced.244  For 
example, some of the children had yet to be admitted to Willowbrook.245  Krugman 
encouraged the parents of these children to consent to their children’s research 
participation by arranging for more rapid admission to the school.246  Other parents, 
whose children already were admitted, were told that Willowbrook was closing due to 
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overcrowding; however, a week or two later, the same parents were told that there would 
be room (and vaccines) in the “hepatitis unit” for children whose parents consented to the 
experiment.247 
¶ 62 Like the Army’s chemical warfare research, the Willowbrook study raises 
concerns relating to the reasonableness of the research risks in relation to the expected 
benefits; the use of a captive, vulnerable population for medical experimentation; and 
coerced, third-party consent to research participation.248  With respect to the 
reasonableness of the risks in relationship to the expected benefits, Krugman argued that 
the mild hepatitis infections benefited the students by protecting them against future, 
more severe strains of hepatitis.249  Others believe that the intentional infection of 
students with hepatitis can in no way be classified as directly therapeutic, or a benefit, to 
the students and that it must be classified as a research harm because hepatitis B causes 
lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death.250  
The question thus becomes whether the harms associated with intentional hepatitis 
infection were reasonable in relationship to the knowledge that was expected to result.  
Most (other than Krugman) believe that the Willowbrook experiment was unreasonable 
because it offered no direct benefit to the students and directly caused the students’ 
hepatitis infection, even though knowledge regarding the natural course of hepatitis and 
its treatment was expected to, and did in fact, result.251   
¶ 63 With respect to concerns relating to captivity and vulnerability, the subjects 
were institutionalized at a school for individuals with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities.  Although the students probably could have left the school with their parents’ 
permission and agreement to care for them, some of the parents were told that their 
children would lose their current admissions if they did not volunteer their children for 
the study.252  Other parents were told that their children could be admitted to the school if 
they volunteered their children for the study.253  These facts support the children’s 
constructive captivity.  Stated another way, although the children technically could have 
left Willowbrook with their parents’ permission, Krugman used the parents’ desire to 
obtain or maintain institutional placement for their children to coerce (some say 
blackmail) the parents into volunteering their children for research.254 
¶ 64 In addition to concerns relating to captive, vulnerable populations, the 
Willowbrook case raises very real competency and informed consent issues.  Again, 
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some patients with mild developmental disabilities, such as attention deficit disorder, 
certainly are competent to consent to their own research participation.  The minor 
students at Willowbrook, however, had severe intellectual disabilities that prohibited 
them from understanding and appreciating the nature and consequences of their own 
research participation.  As a result, the scientists obtained consent from their parents.  I 
already have discussed whether this consent was coerced.  A second question, equally 
important, is whether the consent was informed.  For example, were the parents told that 
intentional infection with hepatitis causes lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the 
liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death?255  If not, the parents’ consent would not be 
considered valid by today’s standards.256 
D. The Development of Federal Protections 
¶ 65 The Army’s chemical warfare research and the Willowbrook study certainly 
were not the only questionable experiments involving patients with psychiatric conditions 
and developmental disabilities that led to the development of human-subjects protections.  
Dozens of other studies, including LSD research conducted on psychiatric patients in the 
1960s257 (and, more recently, drug-free, or “washout,” studies in which scientists take 
patients who have schizophrenia off their medications to establish their baseline behavior 
prior to administering new medications, resulting in suicide in some cases),258 called (and 
continue to call) attention to the need for, and the enforcement of, ethical and legal 
principles governing human subjects research. 
¶ 66 The development of ethical and legal protections for human subjects has been 
thoroughly researched and documented elsewhere.259  In this section, I provide a much 
abbreviated history of the development of relevant American ethical and legal human-
subjects protections with a focus on the attempted development of protections for 
research subjects with decisional impairments.  As you read this section, pay attention to 
the guidance provided by each ethical and legal authority regarding balancing research 
risks and benefits, especially in emerging disciplines, as well as who, if anyone, can 
consent to research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional 
impairment.260 
¶ 67 The first modern code mandating protection of human subjects was, ironically, 
adopted in Germany prior to the Third Reich.261  The “Reich Circular of 1931,” which 
built on a 1900 directive from the Prussian minister for religious, educational, and 
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medical affairs, established fourteen provisions, including provisions that required 
scientists conducting human-subjects research to establish a careful research design, to 
give to potential subjects appropriate information about the research project, to obtain 
consent prior to research, and to provide special protections for vulnerable subjects.262  
The Reich Circular required consent, whether first-party or proxy, to be given “in a clear 
and undebatable manner.”263  Given its requirement for special protections and its 
reference to proxy consent, the Reich Circular thus expressly considered that some 
research projects might involve vulnerable or incompetent subjects. 
¶ 68 The story of United States v. Brandt (the “Nazi Doctors’ Trial”)264 and the 
resulting Nuremberg Code265 is, by now, well known.  The Nazi Doctors’ Trial was the 
first of twelve trials for war crimes that U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in 
Nuremberg, Germany, following World War II.266  Twenty of the twenty-three 
defendants (physicians who were accused of murder, torture, and other atrocities) had 
been involved in human experiments designed to contribute to knowledge regarding the 
survival of German pilots and soldiers.267  The physicians had recruited human subjects 
from the Dachau prison camp and exposed them to low air pressures, lack of oxygen, ice-
cold tubs of water, subfreezing temperatures, gunshot wounds, burns, amputations, and 
chemical and biological agents.268  By the end of the Nazi Doctors’ Trial in 1947, seven 
of the twenty-three defendants were acquitted, seven received death sentences, and the 
remainder received prison sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment.269 
¶ 69 The chief medical advisor to the Nuremberg judges, Dr. Leo Alexander, wrote a 
memorandum to the trial judges, one part of which included standards for the ethical 
conduct of human subjects research.270  (In his memorandum, Dr. Alexander had 
identified individuals with mental illness as a population that should receive special 
protection; however, the judges declined to incorporate these special protections in their 
final opinion.271)  The standards that the judges included in their opinion became known 
as the Nuremberg Code.272  Although the code contains several ethical requirements 
relating to yielding fruitful results, basing human experimentation on prior animal 
experimentation, avoiding all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury, and 
having no expectation of death or disabling injury,273 the code perhaps is most well 
known for its first line:  “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential.”274  This requirement, which by its terms refers to the human subject, 
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immediately questions the propriety of research involving individuals who cannot 
consent to their own research participation.275  The first line of the code is followed by 
some explanatory language: 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give 
consent, should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of 
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion, and 
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision.  This latter element requires that before the 
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there 
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the 
experiment; the methods and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects 
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation 
in the experiment.276 
¶ 70 The meaning of this explanatory language continues to be debated.  Some 
commentators believe that the “legal capacity” requirement prohibits individuals with 
decisional impairments and children from taking part in research; others believe that the 
requirement forbids only individuals with decisional impairments and children from 
signing the consent form.277  Some commentators believe that the “so situated” clause 
refers to captive individuals, such as individuals in prisons and mental institutions, who 
may be coerced into consenting to research by reason of their captivity.278  Moreover, 
some commentators believe that the “knowledge and comprehension” and “enlightened 
decision” references prohibit individuals with decisional impairments from participating 
in research.279  Finally, although the Nuremberg Code does not so state, many believe 
that the entire first paragraph, which establishes the basic principle of informed consent, 
comes into play only following a positive assessment of research benefits and risks.280 
¶ 71 With respect to balancing research risks and benefits, the Nuremberg Code 
contains two relevant statements:  “The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful 
results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not 
                                                 
275
 COLEMAN, supra note 160, at 585 (“A literal application of this provision would preclude any research 
with individuals who lack the mental capacity to provide informed consent—for example comatose 
patients. . . .”). 
276
 The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in VANDERPOOL, supra note 160, at 431. 
277
 ADIL E. SHAMOO & FELIX A. KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, ETHICS OF THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
76 (2002).  See generally CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH 
HUMAN SUBJECTS 585 (2005) (explaining that the “legal capacity” requirement could be interpreted to 
preclude any research with individuals who lack decision-making capacity but that such a policy would 
make it difficult to develop treatments for individuals affected with these conditions; further noting that the 
amount of research involving adults who lack decision-making capacity is growing exponentially, thus 
suggesting that the scientists who conduct this research do not interpret the “legal capacity” requirement to 
preclude such research). 
278




 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 160, at 154. 
2008  Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness 35 
 
Vol. 13 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY No. 2 
 
random and unnecessary in nature,”281 and “[t]he degree of risk to be taken should never 
exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by 
the experiment.”282  Taken together, these statements suggest that nontherapeutic research 
(i.e., research that does not directly or potentially benefit individual subjects) is 
permissible so long as it contributes to nonrandom generalizable knowledge and is not 
risky.  (In contrast, the new Atomic Energy Commission in a meeting held the same year 
unsuccessfully attempted to impose a requirement of potential benefit for the subject.)283 
¶ 72 The distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research became even 
more important in the 1960s, although the distinction was relevant only to the 
requirement of consent, not the permissibility of the conduct of the research.  In 1964, 
during its Eighteenth Assembly in Helsinki, Finland, the World Medical Association 
adopted a code (the Declaration of Helsinki) that distinguished therapeutic research, 
defined as research combined with patient care, from nontherapeutic research, defined as 
“purely scientific research that has no therapeutic value or purpose for the specific 
subjects studied.”284  The declaration did not require informed consent for therapeutic 
research if consent was not “consistent with patient psychology.”285  The declaration did 
require consent for nontherapeutic research except when mental incapacity made it 
impossible to obtain informed consent (in which case permission from the responsible 
relative would replace the subject’s consent if allowed under applicable national law).286 
¶ 73 With the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki firmly in place, the 
U.S. government increased its protective efforts in the 1970s.287  In 1971, the federal 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) established guidelines for the 
protection of federally funded human research subjects, including a requirement for prior 
IRB approval of research protocols.288  Among other things, IRBs now had the 
responsibility of balancing the risks posed to subjects by particular research protocols 
against the combination of the benefits to the subjects and the importance of the 
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knowledge to be gained.289  Only if the benefits outweighed the risks could the IRB 
approve the study and allow subjects to be offered research participation.290 
¶ 74 In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act, which created the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research (the “Commission”).291  The Commission was charged with recommending the 
basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of human-subjects research and 
developing guidelines to assure that human-subjects research complied with these 
principles.292  In February 1978, near the end of its tenure, the Commission issued a 
special report (the “Commission Special Report”) making recommendations for human-
subjects research involving individuals “institutionalized as mentally infirm,” which 
included “individuals with mental illness, mental retardation, emotional disturbances, 
psychoses, senility, and other impairments of a similar nature who reside in an 
institution.”293  The Commission recommended that research participation not interfere 
with the care of such individuals and that research projects be relevant to the condition of 
any subjects who cannot consent to their own research participation.294  Although HEW 
proposed regulations based on the recommendations set forth in the Commission Special 
Report in November 1978,295 the agency did not adopt them in final form then or 
thereafter in 1981 or 1983, when the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research further recommended 
their adoption.296 
¶ 75 At the very end of its tenure (in late 1978), the Commission completed its by-
now-famous Belmont Report, which established three basic ethical principles (respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice) and examined their application to requirements relating 
to informed consent, the assessment of research risks and benefits, and the selection of 
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research subjects.297  HEW formally published the Belmont Report in the Federal 
Register on April 18, 1979.298  With respect to the involvement of individuals with 
decisional impairments in human-subjects research, the Belmont Report recognized that 
(1) special provisions may need to be made for these individuals, (2) the principle of 
respect for persons requires consent to research participation to come from a third party 
who is most likely to understand the individual’s situation and to act in the individual’s 
best interest, and (3) the third party should have the opportunity to observe the research 
as it proceeds and withdraw the individual from the research if withdrawal is in the 
individual’s best interest.299 
¶ 76 In 1981, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which 
was the successor to HEW, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued 
regulations based on the Belmont Report.300  Ten years later, more than a dozen federal 
agencies adopted the core of the HHS regulations, which are now referred to as the 
Common Rule.301  Today, the Common Rule is shared by seventeen federal departments 
and agencies302 and regulates U.S. federally funded research, research conducted at an 
institution that has obligated itself through a multiple project assurance to comply with 
the Common Rule with respect to all of its research, and research conducted in 
contemplation of a submission to the FDA.303 
¶ 77 As amended over the years, the Common Rule contains special subparts for 
several vulnerable populations, including fetuses, pregnant women, and human in vitro 
fertilization,304 as well as prisoners305 and children.306  The Common Rule also requires 
IRBs to ensure vulnerable research groups, including “mentally disabled persons,” 
receive additional safeguards designed to protect their health and welfare.307  Finally, the 
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Common Rule in whole or in part); MORENO, supra note 160, at 165 (discussing the adoption of the 
Common Rule by seventeen different federal agencies); EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 42  (same). 
303
 See EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 42-43. 
304
 45 C.F.R. Part 46, Subpart B. 
305
 45 C.F.R. Part 46, Subpart C. 
306
 45 C.F.R. Part 46, Subpart D. 
307
 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2007) (“When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion 
or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or 
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards have been included in the 
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”).  The safeguards could involve consultation with 
specialists concerning the risks and benefits of a procedure for these populations or special monitoring of 
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Common Rule requires IRBs to consider the inclusion of one or more individuals who are 
knowledgeable about and experienced in working with individuals who are members of 
these vulnerable populations if the IRB regularly reviews research involving such 
populations.308 
¶ 78 The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special subpart governing 
human-subjects research involving adults who have decisional impairments due to a 
severe psychiatric condition, intellectual or developmental disability, disorder of 
consciousness, or other mental or neurological disorder.309  Why a special subpart was 
not included continues to be debated.  HEW, through its secretary, suggested that the 
rules it proposed in 1978 “had produced a ‘lack of consensus’” and that the core of the 
Common Rule “adequately . . . protect[ed]” individuals with decisional impairments.310  
Former Commission member Al Jonsen reported concern by others that the 
Commission’s recommendations would stifle research into mental conditions 
accompanied by decisional impairments.311  Harvard Professor Neil Chayet shared these 
concerns and stated that “the legal and medical perspectives on the subject are 
fundamentally incompatible—particularly in the area of the mentally disabled, where 
appreciation of the concept of informed consent is well on its way to paralyzing research 
and treatment.”312 
¶ 79 Without a special subpart to guide their efforts, scientists who design (and IRBs 
that review) research projects involving adults with decisional impairments must ensure 
that each project complies with the generic criteria set forth in the core of the Common 
Rule.313  Among other things, these core criteria require the following:  (1) the risks to 
subjects to be minimized; (2) the risks to subjects to be “reasonable in relation to 
anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may 
reasonably be expected to result”; (3) informed consent to be “sought from each 
prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative”; and (4) “when 
some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,” 
including individuals with mental disorders, additional safeguards to be included to 
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.314 
¶ 80 The multi-agency adoption of the Common Rule in 1991 did not end the federal 
government’s struggle with how best to protect human research subjects.  The Clinton 
Administration in 1995 formed the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 
and charged it with studying important issues in bioethics, including human-subjects 
                                                                                                                                                 
consent processes to ensure voluntariness.  It is not known how frequently IRBs implement these and other 
safeguards.  See generally MORENO, supra note 160, at 165.   
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 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2007). 
309
 See MORENO, supra note 160, at 165. 
310
 Levine, supra note 296, at 1. 
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 See generally MORENO, supra note 160, at 164. 
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 Neil L. Chayet, Informed Consent of the Mentally Disabled: A Failing Fiction, 6 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 
82, 82 (1976); MORENO, supra note 160, at 165 (quoting Chayet). 
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 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2007). 
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research.315  Over the next two years, the NBAC held hearings on several issues, 
including research participation by individuals with decisional impairments.316  In 
December 1998, NBAC issued a special report (the “NBAC Report”) addressing research 
involving individuals whose mental disorders may affect their decision-making 
capacity.317  NBAC acknowledged the tension between the rapid advances in science and 
technology, especially in the area of the diagnosis and treatment of individuals with 
mental disorders, and the rather staid core provisions of the Common Rule: 
During the nearly two decades in which the current federal regulations for 
the protection of human subjects have been in place, important scientific 
research on the cause and treatment of mental disorders has continued and 
expanded. . . . NBAC shares what it believes to be a broad base of support 
for continuing efforts to more fully understand and treat mental disorders.  
NBAC recommends additional new protections with the deepest respect 
for the many people involved in research on these disorders: those with a 
disorder that may affect decisionmaking capacity.318 
¶ 81 With this lead in, it was not surprising that the NBAC found that “a cogent case 
could be made” for the establishment of a new subpart in the Common Rule that would 
govern human-subjects research involving adults with decisional impairments.319  The 
NBAC also recommended that IRBs be permitted to approve a research study that 
presents only minimal risk (as are many fMRI investigations into DOC) so long as the 
subject consents or, if the subject cannot consent due to lack of decision-making capacity, 
the subject’s legally authorized representative (LAR) consents.320  The NBAC also 
recognized that years, if not decades, could pass before a federal agency would adopt 
final regulations implementing their recommendations and therefore suggested that 
scientists, academic medical centers, and IRBs voluntarily adopt and comply with the 
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 Clinton Executive Order 12975, Protection of Human Research Subjects and Creation of National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,036 (Oct. 5, 1995) (mandating the review of current 
human subjects regulations).  See generally EATON & KENNEDY, supra note 160, at 44. 
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 See generally SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 79 (discussing the work of the NBAC). 
317
 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY (1998), 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/TOC.htm (last visited August 2, 2007) [hereinafter, NBAC 
REPORT]. 
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 Id. at Executive Summary, available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Executive.htm 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2007). 
319
 Id. (“NBAC believes that a cogent case can be made for requiring additional special protections in 
research involving as subjects persons with impaired decision making capacity, but has chosen to focus this 
report on persons with mental disorders, in part because of this population’s difficult history of 
involvement in medical research.”); id. at Summary and Recommendations, available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Moving.htm#NewRegs (last visited Aug. 2, 2007) (“Many 
of the regulatory proposals made by NBAC could, however, also be accomplished by the creation of a new 
subpart in 45 CFR 46.  Adoption of a subpart has the advantage of permitting affected federal agencies to 
act as expeditiously as they choose to change the regulatory requirements for their own intramural and 
extramural research.”).  See generally SHAMOO & KHIN-MAUNG-GYI, supra note 277, at 79 (examining the 
NBAC Report).  
320
 NBAC REPORT, supra note 317, at Recommendations 10 and 14, available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Moving.htm#NewRegs (last visited Aug. 2, 2007). 
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substance of the NBAC Report.321 
¶ 82 As of today, neither HHS nor any other signatory to the Common Rule has 
adopted in federal regulations the NBAC’s recommendations.322  The absence of federal 
law governing research involving adults with decisional impairments does not mean, 
however, that scientists are not conducting research projects involving these populations; 
in fact, the number of projects has recently increased.323  Without any specific federal 
guidance,324 scientists, IRBs, federal agencies, lawyers, ethicists, and advocacy groups 
are left to draw their own opinions regarding the following: the appropriateness of 
enrolling individuals with decisional impairments, including DOC, into research studies; 
the class of risk to which various types of neuroimaging should be assigned; how to 
balance research risks and benefits; and who constitutes a LAR permitted to consent to 
the individual’s research participation.325 
E. The Development of State Protections 
¶ 83 Perhaps due to the lack of express federal guidance, some state legislatures, state 
courts, and state agencies have attempted to more specifically address—via legislation, 
regulation, judicial opinions, and attorney general guidance—the rights of human 
subjects with decisional impairments.326  New York, for example, adopted a “Protection 
of Human Subjects” statute designed to “protect its people against the unnecessary and 
improper risk of pain, suffering or injury resulting from human research conducted 
without their knowledge or consent.”327  The New York statute requires a human-
research review committee to determine that the risks to human subjects are outweighed 
by the potential benefits or by the importance of the knowledge to be gained.328  In the 
case of human subjects who do not have decision-making capacity, the statute expressly 
permits another person who is legally empowered to act on the subject’s behalf to consent 
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 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276 
JAMA 67, 72 (1996) (“In the meantime, it will be up to investigators and IRBs to maintain the precarious 
balance between the interests of mentally disabled subjects and the public’s desire for medical progress.”); 
J. de Champlain & J. Patenaude, Review of a Mock Research Protocol in Functional Neuroimaging by 
Canadian Research Ethics Boards, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 530, 533 (2006) (“The risk-benefit component is the 
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left to find their own way may partly account for the variability of decisions in our study.”). 
326
 See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the Decisionally 
Impaired in Medical Research—Maryland’s Policy Initiative, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 123, 125 
(1998) (“Because federal law leaves unanswered the question of who is a ‘legally authorized 
representative’ for consent to research, researchers who seek to rely on this provision of federal law must 
turn to relevant state law for guidance.  Unfortunately, little, if any, state law directly addresses this 
issue.”). 
327
 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2440 (2007). 
328
 Id. § 2444(2). 
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to the subject’s research participation.329 
¶ 84 New York is not the only state to have considered research involving individuals 
with decisional impairments.  The Maryland Legislature found that “[r]esearch involving 
decisionally incapacitated individuals may be essential under some circumstances if 
science is to understand and ultimately combat diseases of the brain, including . . . severe 
trauma” and that “[r]esearchers should seek to enroll decisionally incapacitated 
individuals as research subjects only if the research is likely to yield generalizable 
knowledge important to the understanding or amelioration of the subjects’ disorder or 
condition, and the knowledge cannot be obtained without their participation.”330  
California also has a relevant statute that allows for consent to research participation by a 
conservator but only “for medical experiments related to maintaining or improving the 
health of the human subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological 
condition of the human subject.”331  A number of other states have statutes that require 
court approval before a guardian or conservator may consent to the research participation 
of an individual with decisional impairment if the court can determine that the 
experimental treatment will be in the individual’s best interests.332  In states that do not 
address consent to research participation, some scientists rely on consent-to-treatment 
statutes or durable power of attorney for healthcare statutes to find a proxy.333 
¶ 85 In addition to state statutes and regulations, state courts and attorneys general 
weigh in on ethical and legal questions relating to human-subjects research.  In T.D. v. 
New York State, for example, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, 
reviewed a challenge to state regulations governing more-than-minimal-risk 
nontherapeutic and possibly therapeutic experiments.334  The court found that the 
regulations did not adequately safeguard the health and welfare of human research 
subjects and violated both the federal and the New York due process clauses.335  
Likewise, the Maryland Attorney General issued a report on Alzheimer’s disease care 
and part of the report addressed the applicability of Maryland’s surrogate consent to 
treatment statute to the research setting.  The attorney general concluded that healthcare 
agents and surrogates may consent to an individual’s research participation if, and only if, 
the research “presents a reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit,” reasoning that the 
statute was designed to regulate only healthcare, not experimental studies designed only 
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 Id. § 2442 (“If the human subject be otherwise  legally  unable  to  render consent,  such  consent  shall 
be subscribed to in writing by such other person as may be legally  empowered  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  
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 Draft, An Act Concerning Research—Protection of Decisionally Incapacitated Individuals, Appendix A, 
May 5, 1997, Part I, § 20-501(c)-(d) (on file with author). 
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 T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
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 Id. at 194. 
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to acquire knowledge.336  Research, according to the attorney general, should not be 
conflated with healthcare.337 
IV. MORAL IMPERATIVE OR LEGAL AND ETHICS FAILURE? 
¶ 86 Keeping these federal and state developments in mind, I now examine the 
ethical and legal implications of neuroimaging research into DOC. To start, I identify the 
anticipated benefits of these studies, if any, and the importance of the knowledge that 
may reasonably be expected to result.  Then, I balance these benefits against the relevant 
risks. 
A. Neuroimaging Benefits   
¶ 87 A benefit may be defined as “a valued or desired outcome; an advantage.”338  
Research benefits may be divided into direct benefits, indirect benefits, and aspirational 
benefits.339  Direct benefits, which are those benefits that arise from the subject’s receipt 
of the intervention under study, include positive physiological responses, diagnostic 
benefits, and preventive benefits.340  The analysis of direct benefits in the context of 
neuroimaging research into DOC is tricky because neuroimaging research is not expected 
to produce an immediate positive physiological response.  For example, the authors of 
fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 were not studying the ability of a neural implant to reduce the 
length of a subject’s impaired consciousness or to assist a subject in progressing from one 
DOC, such as VS, to MCS or consciousness.341  So we might state that the research 
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 See supra Parts I(B), (C), and (D).  Although the authors of fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 were not studying 
the efficacy of neural implants or other interventions for the treatment of disorders of consciousness, other 
clinicians and scientists have.  Famous Floridian Terri Schiavo, for example, was transported to California 
for the implantation of a neural stimulator, although it ultimately had no effect on her VS.  Other patients 
who have received implants reportedly have demonstrated a positive physiological response.  See Tom 
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subjects in fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 (as well as participants in other similar neuroimaging 
studies) were not receiving an immediate, positive physiological benefit as a result of 
research participation (although I will discuss possible secondary rehabilitation-planning 
benefits in a moment). 
¶ 88 Neuroimaging research into DOC has, however, resulted in several diagnostic 
benefits.  Recall fMRI Study 3, in which the study authors used fMRI to scan and 
compare the brain activations of seven patients in VS and four patients in MCS.342  
Among other things, the study authors found that two of the patients in VS and all four of 
the patients in MCS showed activation not only in the primary auditory cortex but also in 
hierarchically higher-order associative temporal areas.343  The scientists also conducted 
additional behavioral testing at one, two, and three months poststudy to examine the 
prognostic value of the study344 and found that the two patients in VS who showed the 
most widespread activation actually had improved to MCS.345  Thus, we might say that 
the research subjects in fMRI Study 3 (especially the two patients in VS who showed the 
most widespread activation and eventually emerged to MCS) received a more accurate 
differential diagnosis and prognostic assessment.346  fMRI Study 3 is not the only 
neuroimaging study that has yielded these diagnostic and prognostic benefits.347  A 
review article speaks more generally about the potential diagnostic and prognostic 
benefits of other fMRI studies, as well as benefits relating to rehabilitation planning: 
The results of these studies, although preliminary, suggest a number of 
potential clinical applications.  Although bedside clinical examination 
remains the criterion standard for establishing diagnosis, fMRI activation 
profiles may serve an adjunctive diagnostic role when behavioral findings 
are limited or ambiguous.  Patients who demonstrate activation of 
language network loci in response to linguistic stimulation may be more 
likely to retain receptive and expressive language functions than those 
who fail to selectively activate these structures.  In such cases, clinicians 
should be particularly cautious before rendering a diagnosis of vegetative 
state.  fMRI activation profiles may also inform prognosis in patients who 
show no behavioral evidence of language or visual processing.  In such 
patients, robust activation of cortical networks that mediate language or 
visuoperception may presage subsequent recovery of these functions.  
Interestingly, [certain] patients [have] regained expressive speech as well 
                                                 
342
 Di et al., supra note 10, at 896.  
343
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 To simplify my benefit analysis, I have focused only on fMRI Study 3, but fMRI Studies 1 and 2 also 
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MCS in response to the forward playing of the audio narratives.  Schiff et al., supra note 8, at 514.  In fMRI 
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1402. 
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as the ability to consistently follow basic commands.  [Another] patient, 
who initially showed no evidence of object recognition, regained the 
ability to identify and use common objects in a functional manner before 
hospital discharge. . . . 
The fMRI findings may also provide guidance in rehabilitation planning.  
In patients with disorders of consciousness, it is often difficult to 
determine if the absence of command-following is due to impaired 
arousal, aphasia, akinesia, or motor impairment. The approach to 
treatment may differ considerably depending on which of these disorders 
accounts for the failure to follow commands.  If one were to find 
significant activation of left temporal structures involved in language 
processing, but minimal activation of mesial frontal structures linked to 
behavioral initiation, it would be reasonable to assume that akinesia was 
the principal factor in the command-following deficit.  Consequently, 
rehabilitative interventions would likely include aggressive behavioral 
prompting strategies and neurostimulants rather than aphasia therapy.348 
¶ 89 Some believe that neuroimaging research into DOC yields not only diagnostic, 
prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning benefits but also benefits that I will call, for want 
of a better term, “preventive benefits.”  Specifically, some families and ethicists are 
comfortable withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from patients in VS 
but not patients in MCS.349  Arguably, one preventive benefit of a study involving a 
patient previously diagnosed as VS who, via fMRI, demonstrates minimally conscious–
like processing, would be that the patient’s life support will remain intact and the patient 
will not be allowed to die.  Others would disagree about the characterization of such a 
finding as a benefit, emphasizing that the findings of neuroimaging studies should not 
alter end-of-life decision making: “None of this changes the fact however that most 
people wouldn’t want to be kept alive artificially in a MCS either and going from a 
[persistent] VS to an MCS is no real improvement in the big scheme of things.”350 
¶ 90 In summary, neuroimaging studies into DOC, at least currently, do not and are 
not expected to yield an immediate positive physiological benefit to research subjects.  
However, a review of the relevant literature shows that some neuroimaging research 
yields (1) immediate diagnostic and prognostic benefits (especially for patients believed 
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 See, e.g., Laureys et al., Brain Function, supra note 11, at 544 (“Foremost is the concern that diagnostic 
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 See, e.g., Rosielle, supra note 129. 
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to be in VS but in whom fMRI reveals minimally conscious-like processing), (2) the 
benefit of assistance with rehabilitation planning, and (3) an arguable preventive benefit, 
which would be the nonapplication of measures to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment. 
¶ 91 The second type of research benefit includes indirect benefits, also called 
collateral benefits.351  Indirect benefits arise from being a subject even if the subject does 
not receive the intervention under study.352  Indirect benefits can be physiological, such 
as a free physical examination, or psychological, such as the psychological reward of 
inclusion.353  The participants in fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3 received some collateral 
benefits.  All of the participants in fMRI Study 3, for example, received extensive and 
repeated clinical examinations, including examinations using five different validated 
behavioral scales, to arrive at an initial diagnosis of VS or MCS prior to the participants’ 
brain scans.354 
¶ 92 The third type of research benefit includes aspirational benefits, which include 
benefits to society and future patients as a result of the study.355  The production of 
generalizable knowledge has been described as the raison d’être of research.356  A 
research project must offer a reasonable prospect of producing generalizable knowledge; 
otherwise, the risks of the project will not be justified, even if the subjects will directly 
benefit.357  Aspirational benefits are, perhaps, the easiest of the three benefits to identify 
in neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC.  Relevant aspirational benefits 
include knowledge regarding the underlying functional neuroanatomy of the different 
DOCs, data that might be used by future clinicians to make more accurate differential 
diagnoses, data that might be used by future clinicians to herald further recovery, and 
data that might be used by future clinicians to plan rehabilitation strategies.358  Some 
scientists believe that neuroimaging studies also may, someday, lead to the development 
of methods of communication with some individuals with DOC359 and, further down the 
road, support interventions such as neuromodulation that may help restore function to 
some individuals with DOC.360 
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 Id.  See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2007) (defining research as “a systematic investigation, including 
research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge”). 
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 See, e.g., Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S74 (“potential benefits [include] . . . a better understanding of 
mechanisms of recovery, improved neuroimaging, electrophysiologic, and behavioral assessment 
techniques and the development of effective neurorehabilitative interventions.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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 See, e.g., Owen et al., supra note 9, at 1402 (“However, in the case described here, the presence of 
reproducible and robust task-dependent responses to command without the need for any practice or training 
suggests a method by which some noncommunicative patients, including those diagnosed as vegetative, 
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their thoughts to those around them by modulating their own neural activity.”). 
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 See, e.g., Giacino et al., supra note 7, at S67 (2006) (“Improvements in patient characterization may, in 
turn, provide new opportunities for restoration of function through interventional neuromodulation.”). 
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¶ 93 Before I balance these direct, indirect, and aspirational benefits against the risks 
of neuroimaging research, a historical comparison may help place these benefits in their 
proper context.  Recall Harold Blauer, the tennis professional who was enrolled in the 
Army’s chemical warfare research project in late 1952 and early 1953, a few weeks 
before he was scheduled to be released from the New York State Psychiatric Institute.361  
Blauer received no direct benefits as a result of his research participation.  The mescaline 
injections Blauer received were completely unrelated to his psychiatric condition362 and 
were not intended to serve any diagnostic or therapeutic purpose.363  Blauer also received 
few, if any, indirect benefits.  Although some subjects experience a psychological benefit 
due to their inclusion in a research project, Blauer most likely did not; indeed, he was 
“apprehensive” about his participation in the study, which required “considerable 
persuasion,” and he verbally expressed both his dislike of the injections and his desire to 
withdraw from the study on more than one occasion.364  Perhaps one could attempt to 
characterize the free postinjection nursing examinations365 as an indirect benefit; 
however, since these examinations served only to document Blauer’s suffering, they 
likely would not qualify.  The study did, however, involve aspirational benefits.  
According to the Army’s research proposal, “new technical data will be derived . . . 
which will provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents both for 
offensive use as sabotage weapons and for protection against them.”366  These wartime 
aspirations were, however, completely unrelated to the subjects’ psychiatric conditions.  
Stated another way, the Army was using a population of individuals with mental illness 
to conduct an experiment that would in no way contribute to knowledge regarding the 
diagnosis or treatment of mental illness. 
¶ 94 Like the Army’s chemical warfare research, the Willowbrook study also yielded 
no direct benefits (unless one wants to classify intentional infection with hepatitis as a 
preventive benefit) and few, if any, indirect benefits, although fair aspirational benefits 
(many of which ultimately were achieved) relating to the treatment and prevention of 
hepatitis B.367  Again, though, the scientists were using a population of individuals with 
developmental disabilities to conduct an experiment that would in no way contribute to 
knowledge regarding the diagnosis or habilitation of such developmental disabilities. 
¶ 95 The slim benefits of the Army chemical warfare research and the Willowbrook 
study certainly do not stand as a minimum threshold above which all other study benefits 
will tend to favorably balance against research risks.  Other studies yielding direct and 
indirect benefits of a greater likelihood and magnitude also may not balance favorably 
against research risks.  The Army chemical warfare study and the Willowbrook study are, 
however, classic examples of the types of experiments the Common Rule and other 
ethical and legal guidelines were designed to protect against; that is, experiments 
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362
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involving vulnerable populations that are expected to yield no direct benefits, few if any 
indirect benefits, and some aspirational benefits that are completely unrelated to the 
subjects’ vulnerable conditions.  In contrast, fMRI Studies 1, 2, and 3, as well as other 
neuroimaging studies into DOC, involve fair diagnostic, prognostic, and rehabilitation-
planning benefits; an arguable preventive benefit; some indirect benefits; and several 
aspirational goals that directly relate to the management and treatment of DOC. 
B. Neuroimaging Risks 
¶ 96 Although the Common Rule defines only minimal risk, not risk, 368 a research 
risk may be defined as the probability of harm or injury (physical, psychological, social, 
or economic) that occurs as a result of research participation.369  IRBs must consider not 
only the nature of research risks but also their likelihood and magnitude.370  Research 
involving MRI, including fMRI, requires its subjects to lie inside a relatively narrow 
horizontal cylinder located within a larger machine that houses a permanent magnetic 
field of high intensity, usually 1.5 Tesla or more.371  Body images, including 
neuroimages, are acquired via technologies that cause “the fast commutation of smaller 
additional magnetic fields ([called] gradients) and the sending of quick but intense radio-
frequency pulses.”372  For purposes of this article, I will simply assume that 
neuroimaging research does raise some social and economic risks, including the possible 
loss of confidentiality and privacy.373  The question I will address here is whether MRI 
poses physical, or possibly psychological, risks to human subjects with DOC. 
¶ 97 The FDA regulates two of the parameters that can be used during MRI: the 
deposition of heat and the threshold for commuting the magnetic field.374  To the extent 
scientists involved in neuroimaging research use MRI machines that are approved for 
clinical use by the FDA and contain software that both compute the correct parameters 
and ensure they are not exceeded, any possible risks relating to the rise of the subject’s 
tissue temperature or the stimulation of the subject’s peripheral nerves should be 
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minimized.375  Most would agree that “there are no known significant risks with [MRI] at 
this time since the radiofrequency magnetic fields and magnetic fields, at the strengths 
used, are felt to be without harm,” at least in nonpregnant persons.376 
¶ 98 As a result, many believe that the only possibly risky aspects of MRI relate to its 
magnetic field, which is strong enough to displace ferromagnetic objects, and its noise.377  
MRI’s permanent magnetic field can easily move coins, pens, watches, hair clips, belts, 
the underwire in some bras, chairs, clipboards, and any other object that contains metal 
that might happen to be located in the imaging suite or on or within the subject.378  In the 
clinical setting, including hospitals and imaging centers, the FDA has found lapses in 
human-controlled screening and safety measures that have resulted in patient injury and 
death, including one case in which a patient died when her aneurysm clip moved during a 
clinical MRI scan and lacerated her middle cerebral artery.379  This result occurred 
notwithstanding the policy of most hospitals and imaging centers to assign to scanning 
procedures only certified radiology technicians who have completed one to four years of 
relevant coursework, including coursework in MRI safety, and to hold them responsible 
for complying with detailed and redundant screening policies and procedures that ensure 
that no metal objects are left in the imaging suite or on the patient and that patients in 
whom metal is identified are not scanned.380  Some, although not all, suggest that safety 
procedures may be less standardized (and the risks of adverse events may be greater) in 
the research setting, where individuals who conduct screening examinations (including 
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 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., FDA SAFETY ALERT: MRI RELATED DEATH OF PATIENT WITH 
ANEURYSM CLIP (Nov. 25, 1992), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/safety/112592-mriclip.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2007) (“FDA has learned of a fatal injury sustained by a patient with a cerebral aneurysm 
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 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, RADIOLOGY TECHNOLOGISTS AND 
TECHNICIANS, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos105.htm#training (last visited Aug. 6, 2007) 
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scientists, their graduate students, and other members of their research team) are less 
trained in MRI safety than their clinical counterparts.381 
¶ 99 To minimize the risks associated with flying or emerging metal objects, 
scientists and other study team members who are involved in the actual scanning portion 
of an fMRI study must be specifically trained regarding the ferromagnetic dangers of 
MRI and required to perform sufficiently detailed and redundant screening procedures.382  
Although metal objects located in the imaging suite or on the subject’s person are not too 
difficult to identify, less obvious are metal objects that lie within the subject’s body, 
including pacemakers, aneurysm clips, surgical clips, other metal implants and 
prostheses, metallic shavings from war shrapnel or employment that involved grinding 
metal including metal filings remaining in the eye, dental and orthodontic apparatuses, 
and even metallic substances remaining around the eye due to the application of cosmetic 
eye shadow.383  Although conscious potential subjects can inform study coordinators 
whether they have been exposed to metal in one or more of these ways, subjects with 
DOC cannot.  The potential subject’s exposure to metal would have to be revealed by a 
family member or other person familiar with the subject’s medical and employment 
history, a handheld metal detector, another method of body scanning, or preferably, a 
combination of all three.384 
¶ 100 The other possible MRI risk relates to the noise of the MRI machine.  The sound 
of the magnet working within the MRI machine can be quite loud.385  Analyzing the 
likelihood of the risk of hearing damage or discomfort associated with loud noises to 
individuals with DOC is tricky because one pressing scientific question is whether 
individuals with DOC demonstrate neural activity (and, if so, what kind and what it 
means) when they are exposed to passive auditory tasks.386  Stated (and very much 
conflated) in layperson’s terms, can individuals with DOC hear?387  Assuming only for 
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the sake of argument that individuals with DOC can process auditory stimuli, the 
magnitude of any hearing damage or noise discomfort and the ability of scientists to 
minimize these risks must be assessed. 
¶ 101 Studies involving infants show that an MRI’s magnet noise can be minimized to 
12 decibels (dB) higher than quiet conversation, which is 18 dB lower than a lawn mower 
and 38 dB lower than a car horn.388  In neuroimaging studies involving infants, scientists 
minimize magnet noise by covering the magnet tunnel with a special noise-protection 
foam and placing over each infant’s head a noise-protection helmet that includes 
headphones that are, in turn, covered by an additional foam mold.389  The combination of 
the foam applications and the headphones reduces noise and vibrations inside the 
tunnel.390  Even after implementing these noise protections, the scientists still may deliver 
any auditory stimuli required by the research protocol to the subject through piezoelectric 
loudspeakers located in the headphones.391  In neuroimaging studies involving infants, 
“[t]he level of sound presentation is adjusted to a comfortable level, easily 
understandable above the residual scanning noise by a normal adult. . . . The success of 
[these] noise protection measures is indicated by the fact that many babies fall asleep 
during the imaging procedure, or stay asleep throughout.”392 
¶ 102 Before I balance these possible risks and discomforts against the benefits of 
neuroimaging research and the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result, a 
historical comparison may help place these risks in their proper context.  In the case of 
Harold Blauer and the Army’s chemical warfare research,393 the scientists were aware, as 
a result of prior toxicity testing involving mice, that death (at least to mice) was a fair 
possibility.394  They also knew (or at least one court found that they knew) that the 
scientists had not yet conducted additional toxicity testing sufficient to determine the 
chemical’s safety in humans.395  Likewise, the authors of the Willowbrook study knew 
that the Willowbrook students would be intentionally infected with the hepatitis B virus 
and that such infection can cause lifelong infection, cirrhosis (scarring) of the liver, liver 
cancer, liver failure, and death.396  The significant risks of the Army chemical warfare 
research and the Willowbrook study certainly do not stand as a threshold below which all 
other study risks will tend to favorably balance against research benefits.  Other studies 
yielding risks of a lower likelihood and magnitude also may not balance favorably 
against research benefits.  The Army chemical warfare study and the Willowbrook study 
are, however, classic examples of the types of experiments the Common Rule and other 
ethical and legal guidelines were designed to protect against—that is, experiments that 
involve risks of great magnitude, including death and lifelong infection, which could not 
(then) be prevented.  In contrast, most would agree that current neuroimaging studies into 
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DOC involve two possible risks—ferromagnetic injuries and deaths and noise injury or 
discomfort—although each risk carries a very low probability that can be minimized, if 
not eliminated, with human-controlled safety precautions. 
C. Balancing Risks and Benefits 
¶ 103 Neuroimaging research into DOC thus raises a decades-old question:  How do 
we balance the rights and interests of research subjects with scientific progress and 
benefits to future patients?397  Current federal law establishes a reasonableness test:  Are 
the risks of neuroimaging reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits, if any, to 
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to 
result?398  This assessment is considered the major ethical and legal judgment made in the 
context of human-subjects research.399  The analysis is difficult in part because federal 
and state law provide so little guidance regarding the required balancing and because the 
studies under question involve functional neuroimaging, which many still consider an 
emerging discipline.400 
¶ 104 The former Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) (now, the Office 
for Human Research Protections) has provided some questions to help guide risk-benefit 
assessments, including whether the research involves “the use of interventions that have 
the intent and reasonable probability of providing benefit for the individual subjects or 
only involves procedures performed for research purposes.”401  “In research involving an 
intervention expected to provide direct benefit to the subjects, a certain amount of risk is 
justifiable.”402  On the other hand, “in any trial of a new or not yet validated treatment, 
the ratio of benefits to risks should be similar to those presented by any available 
alternative therapy.”403  As discussed in detail in Part III(A), neuroimaging research into 
DOC may offer its subjects some diagnostic, prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning 
benefits, as well as a debated preventive benefit and several aspirational benefits relating 
to the management and possible treatment of future patients with DOC.  Neuroimaging 
research does not, however, provide an immediate, positive physiological benefit to 
subjects.  Neuroimaging research is, thus, “in between” with respect to benefits.  Again, it 
is not directly and immediately therapeutic; however, it can yield diagnostic and 
prognostic benefits that may, in turn, yield secondary rehabilitation and clinical 
management benefits.  It also may, according to several scientists, help support future 
patients with DOC with respect to methods of communication and, eventually, therapy.  
Importantly, scientists cannot study DOC or contribute to their understanding by studying 
healthy subjects.  Only by enrolling individuals with DOC can the relevant direct and 
aspirational benefits be achieved.  Stated another way, only through better understanding 
of DOC can care for individuals with DOC be improved. 
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¶ 105 According to the former OPRR, in research where no direct benefits to the 
subject are anticipated, the IRB must evaluate whether the risks presented by procedures 
performed solely to obtain generalizable knowledge are ethically acceptable.404  There 
should be a limit to the risks that society (through the government and research 
institutions) asks individuals to accept for the benefit of others, but IRBs should not be 
overly protective.405  As discussed above, neuroimaging conducted without proper 
screening procedures may pose a ferromagnetic risk of injury or death and may cause 
noise discomfort.  However, with sufficiently detailed and redundant screening 
procedures as well as foam installation and headphones, these risks can be minimized if 
not completely eliminated.  The question here is whether these risks, as minimized, are 
reasonable in relation to the benefits of neuroimaging research.  I think they are. 
¶ 106 My opinion is based, in part, on my balancing of human-subjects protections and 
access to therapies.  Taking a purely protectionist stance, we could refuse to allow 
individuals with DOC to participate in neuroimaging research even though the remote 
risks of the research could be minimized if not eliminated by human controls.406  The 
theory behind this position is that it is preferable to protect potential subjects from harm, 
including potential, unlikely harm, even if the result is less progress with respect to 
generalizable knowledge and less progress with respect to the creation of and access to 
new therapies designed to manage, improve, or treat the very conditions from which the 
potential subjects suffer.407  Taking a pure “access” stance, on the other hand, we could 
view any barriers to enrolling individuals with DOC in neuroimaging research as suspect 
because these barriers would prevent the subjects from realizing any diagnostic, 
prognostic, and rehabilitation-planning benefits, as well as prevent future patients from 
realizing the benefits of new therapies.408  From this position, it may be considered 
unethical to exclude an individual with a tentative DOC diagnosis whose research 
participation may lead to a more accurate diagnosis or prognosis.  Neither of these 
approaches is optimal.  Under the first approach, we are protecting human subjects but 
not furthering understanding and possible treatment of the very conditions from which 
they suffer.  Under the second approach, we are contributing to knowledge and 
potentially supporting the development of new methods of communication and new 
therapies although the subjects may not be receiving some or all of the protections they 
deserve. 
¶ 107 I worry that the tragic history of human-subjects research involving individuals 
with psychiatric conditions and developmental disabilities409 is causing IRBs, scientific 
journals, and funding agencies to underappreciate the potential benefits of minimally 
risky fMRI research and to overstate its risks, with the end result being the wholesale 
adoption of a protectionist model with regard to neuroimaging research into DOC.410  I 
think that a careful, detailed, and thoughtful review of the history of exploitation of 
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vulnerable human research subjects (and the relevant ethical and legal principles) is 
necessary each and every time we commence research in an emerging discipline, 
including functional neuroimaging.  This rich history can guide us in our assessment of 
risks, benefits, and their proper balance, as well as the identification of relevant ethical 
and legal principles.  I do not think, however, that neuroimaging research into DOC 
conducted with proper screening procedures and adherence to other protections warrants 
a purely protectionist stance.  Accordingly, I recommend that IRBs, scientific journals, 
and funding agencies no longer stall the conduct, publication, and funding of 
neuroimaging research into DOC if, and only if, all the following criteria are satisfied. 
D. Criteria and Recommendations  
¶ 108 To minimize risks and ensure that they are reasonable in relation to anticipated 
benefits, scientists conducting neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC 
should adhere to the following eleven criteria.411  First, scientists must not be able to 
conduct their proposed research projects with less vulnerable populations.  In the case of 
neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC, this means that the aim of the 
research cannot effectively be accomplished with healthy subjects or subjects with less 
severely impaired consciousness. 
¶ 109 Second, the neuroimaging research must have the aim of contributing to the 
scientific understanding of DOC.  Individuals with DOC should not be included in 
research unrelated to their conditions. 
¶ 110 Third, participation in neuroimaging research must not adversely affect the 
individual’s underlying DOC.  If a potential research subject requires medical or other 
support that must be discontinued during the scan, the individual shall be excluded from 
research participation. 
¶ 111 Fourth, scientists conducting neuroimaging studies into DOC must familiarize 
themselves with all aspects of MRI safety, including the proceedings and safety 
recommendations of the National Institutes of Mental Health Council Workgroup on 
MRI Research Practices, established in 2005.412  Any study team member who is 
involved in the actual scanning process must be thoroughly educated regarding the 
ferromagnetic and noise risks associated with MRI and shall perform or support 
sufficiently detailed and redundant screening of the imaging suite and the body of the 
potential subject.  I highly recommend that the study team contract with an independent 
certified radiology technician or another individual who has comparable education in 
MRI safety.  Although this recommendation will cause the research team to incur 
additional costs, these costs are worth the assurance that the imaging suite and all 
subjects have been properly screened and that the screening process is not rushed. 
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¶ 112 Fifth, if there are any doubts regarding a potential subject’s exposure to metal 
due to the mixed or ambivalent results of another method of body scanning, such as a 
handheld metal scanner, or the family’s unfamiliarity with the individual’s medical or 
employment history, the individual shall be excluded from research participation.413 
¶ 113 Sixth, scientists conducting neuroimaging research shall identify and implement 
the best noise-reduction strategies currently available, which may include foam helmets, 
foam headphones, and foam wrapping of the MRI tunnel.414  Scientists shall consult the 
noise-reduction measures adopted in other neuroimaging studies involving vulnerable 
populations, including infants.  Research designs shall incorporate neuroimaging 
techniques that are “maximally comfortable, fast, and efficient” and should include 
consideration of rapid-acquisition protocols.415 
¶ 114 Seventh, any LAR416 who is approached regarding the research participation of 
an individual with DOC must be informed through both conversation and documentation  
(1) that the neuroimaging study constitutes research, not treatment and that the scientists 
expect the research to yield no direct, immediate physiological benefits to the 
individual;417 (2) of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject,418 
including applicable ferromagnetic risks and any possible noise injuries or discomfort; 
and (3) of any benefits to the subjects or to others that may reasonably be expected to 
result419 including, as applicable, more accurate diagnoses and prognoses, as well as any 
secondary rehabilitation planning or clinical management benefits. 
¶ 115 Eighth, the scientists must allow the LAR to withdraw her consent to the 
individual’s research participation at any time for any reason, including during a scanning 
procedure already begun.420  The scientists or other study team members involved in the 
scanning process shall monitor any verbal or nonverbal signs or signals from the 
individual that may be interpreted as symptoms of distress resulting from the scanning 
procedure.  I anticipate assessment of these signs and signals to be difficult, especially 
with individuals in higher levels of MCS who may display both reflexive movements and 
inconsistent responses to environmental stimuli.  If any member of the study or scanning 
team believes that a particular sign, signal, movement, or response suggests distress, the 
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scanning procedure shall be immediately discontinued.  This criterion is meant to 
incorporate the research ethics concept of “continuous consent,” also called “behavioral 
consent.”421 
¶ 116 Ninth, both scientists and clinicians must be especially careful to assure LARs 
that the care of an individual with DOC will not be affected if the LAR chooses not to 
enroll the individual in research.  Like patients, LARs “may be susceptible to real or 
imaginary pressure” to consent to research.422   If a scientist also happens to be the 
individual’s physician, the LAR may feel obligated to consent to the individual’s research 
participation “out of a desire to please, gratitude, or fear that failure to do so will result in 
hostility or abandonment.”423  LARs who act on behalf of individuals who reside in 
facilities such as rehabilitation hospitals or long-term-care hospitals may be particularly 
worried that the individual will receive poor treatment if the LAR refuses to consent.424  
Patients who are not enrolled in research must continue to receive the same attention, 
care, and compassion as patients who are enrolled.  This criterion is designed to prevent 
the exploitation of captive populations such as the patients at the New York State 
Psychiatric Institute and the student body at Willowbrook. 
¶ 117 Tenth, scientists conducting neuroimaging research into DOC shall adhere to the 
other requirements set forth in the Common Rule including, but not limited to, provisions 
relating to IRB approval of research,425 the informed consent process,426 and 
documentation of informed consent,427 as well as relevant state law. 
¶ 118 Finally, the risk-benefit assessment set forth in this article shall be reviewed 
periodically as neuroimaging research progresses.  Current prospects for neuroimaging 
(including the potential diagnostic, prognostic, clinical management, and rehabilitation-
planning benefits) are optimistic.  Should, however, additional neuroimaging research fail 
to yield these benefits, or should the potential support provided by neuroimaging to future 
methods of communication or therapies evaporate, the anticipated benefits of 
neuroimaging research may no longer outweigh the risks.  In this case, neuroimaging 
research into DOC shall be discontinued until such time as new potential benefits, 
identified through new research hypotheses, again outweigh neuroimaging risks. 
¶ 119 In addition to these eleven criteria, I have one broad recommendation regarding 
consent to research participation by surrogates,428 or proxies,429 which I will simply refer 
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the courts.”). 
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to as LARs because that is the language of the Common Rule.430  In the seventh and 
eighth criteria, I referred to the subject’s LAR; however, I intentionally left my 
discussion of LARs until last to prevent conflation of an LAR’s consent to an individual’s 
research participation with a favorable risk-benefit assessment.  The minimization of 
risks and a favorable risk-benefit assessment must occur prior to offering research 
participation—either to the potential subject or to her LAR.431  Stated another way, 
research in which risks are not minimized or that does not yield a favorable risk-benefit 
assessment may not be offered to a potential subject or her LAR.  I hope the organization 
of this article makes clear the primacy of the minimization of risks and a favorable risk-
benefit assessment. 
¶ 120 To guide the offering of research participation once the research design 
minimizes risk and a favorable risk-benefit assessment has been made, I recommend a 
federal regulation (or, barring a federal regulation, uniform state laws) that address LAR 
consent to human-subjects research involving individuals with decisional impairments if 
the research relates to the individual’s impairment or the same class of impairments.  I 
impose the “relates to” requirement in an attempt to prevent exploitation of individuals 
with decisional impairments in research that is not designed to benefit them or future 
patients with the same type of condition. 
¶ 121 The core of the Common Rule currently allows LARs to consent,432 but the 
definition of LAR refers to “applicable law”433 (i.e., state law in this case), which 
varies.434  Some states allow “any person legally empowered to act” to consent to 
research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional impairment,435 while 
some states designate only certain individuals, such as court-appointed guardians or 
conservators to consent.436 Other states fail to address consent to research participation at 
all.  State-law variation is especially troublesome in the context of biomedical and 
behavioral research, which may be conducted at a laboratory located in one state (e.g., 
New York) but may draw subjects from surrounding states (e.g., the Tri-State Area).437  
                                                                                                                                                 
429
 See, e.g., Marian W. Fischman, Informed Consent, in ETHICS IN RESEARCH WITH HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
44 (Bruce D. Sales & Susan Folkman eds., 2000) (“Therefore, for those potential participants who lack the 
legal capacity to consent, a proxy consent can be obtained from a parent, guardian, or legally authorized 
representative.”); Benjamin Freedman, A Moral Theory of Consent, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: 
BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 266, 273 (Ronald Munson ed., 1979) (“Proxy consent is consent given 
on behalf of an individual who is himself incapable of granting consent.”). 
430
 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (2007) (defining LAR as an “individual or judicial or other body authorized under 
applicable law to consent on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject’s” research participation); id. § 
46.111(a)(4) (“Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative. . . . ”). 
431
 Id. § 46.111(a) (requiring research projects to satisfy each of seven core criteria, including risks to 
subjects being reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits).   
432
 Id. § 46.111(a)(4). 
433
 Moreno, supra note 18 at 14. 
434
 See supra Part II(E) (discussing the variation of state law in this area). 
435
 See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 2007) (“If the human subject be otherwise 
legally unable to render consent, such consent shall be subscribed to in writing by such other person as may 
be legally empowered to act on behalf of the human subject.”). 
436
 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(b)(1) (2007). 
437
 See Steinberg, supra note 12, at 1011. 
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IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies, the latter two of which may be located in 
still other states, are not trained in conflict-of-law principles and currently make ad hoc 
decisions regarding whether LAR consent is ethical or legal regardless of whether 
applicable state law permits such consent.438  I therefore recommend one federal law439 
(preferably) or uniform state laws identifying both the persons empowered to consent to 
research participation on behalf of an individual with a decisional impairment and the 
process for such consent. 
¶ 122 The ethical and legal issues raised by research involving individuals with 
decisional impairments are not going away. Mental disorders, including psychiatric 
conditions, developmental disabilities, and DOCs, are particularly recalcitrant, and 
scientists face tremendous public and peer pressure to discover new therapies.440  
Compliance with the criteria and recommendations set forth above should ensure the 
minimization of risks, a favorable balance of risks and benefits, and uniformity in 
decision making with regard to surrogate consent in the context of neuroimaging research 
involving DOCs. 
                                                 
438
 Id. at 1010. 
439
 The federal law may be established as a new subpart within the Common Rule at 45 C.F.R. Part 46, 
Subpart E. 
440
 See MORENO, supra note 160, at 157.  
